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I. Introduction
The phenomenon of states engaging in a regulatory "race to the bottom" in
pursuit of business activity is familiar. Because firms take into account
employment and labor standards (or the lack thereof) in deciding where to
establish operations, states have incentives to maintain employer-friendly legal
environments to attract or retain such activity.' Academics have long studied
the potential effects of such territory-based competition on worker welfare,
including the increase of outsourcing, downward
pressure on wages, and
2
solidarity.
worker
and
density
union
declining
This Article explores another type of interjurisdictional competition that is
largely absent from the employment law literature. This brand of competition
is extraterritorial in nature: A state seeks to benefit by convincing firms to
select its legal regime to govern the terms of their relationships potentially
1. See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Laborand the GlobalEconomy: FourApproaches
to TransnationalLabor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 990-92 (1995) (stating that
"corporations prefer to establish production facilities in countries with lower wage rates, lower
labor standards and fewer labor rights," and discussing the policy implications); see alsoMario
F. Bognanno et al., The Influence of Wages and IndustrialRelations Environments on the
Production Location Decisions of U.S. MultinationalCorporations,58 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REV. 171, 194 (2005) (concluding that American multinational corporations prefer to locate
production in countries with fewer labor protections and lower wages).
2. Professor Katherine V.W. Stone surveys the literature on interjurisdictional
competition and discusses the pressure it places on domestic labor and employment standards,
wages, and other aspects of worker welfare. See Stone, supra note 1, at 990-97 (noting that
firms' threats to relocate to competing, less-regulated jurisdictions result in decreased union
bargaining power, union acceptance of lower wages, decreased incentives for union lobbying,
and a loss of union cohesion with respect to strategy); Katherine V.W. Stone, To the Yukon and
Beyond: Local Laborers in a GlobalLabor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 93, 95-97
(1999) [hereinafter Stone, Yukon and Beyond] (discussing how globalization "diminishes
labor's bargaining power," decreases the amount of domestic labor regulations, incentivizes the
competitive lowering of labor standards, breeds organizational and inter-union distrust, and
diminishes labor's political power); Katherine V.W. Stone, In the Shadow of Globalization:
Changing Firm-Level Employment Practicesand Shifting Employment Risks in the United
States 2 [hereinafter Stone, Shadow of Globalization] (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-13), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=-1023696
(explaining that globalization leads corporations to seek out territories with more flexible labor
laws, which ultimately undermines employee wages, benefits, and job security).
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independentof the location of underlying business activities. Put another way,
in this market, a state "sells" its law as a commodity to parties operating or
transacting business, in whole or in part, outside of its territory.3
Law-as-commodity competition is not a new concept-it has had a
profound impact on the development ofAmerican corporate law. The "market"4
for business entity charters has driven legal decision making in many states
and has produced a clear winner: Delaware. 5 It has also spawned a vast
literature on whether the resulting legal norms are problematic-corporate
law's race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top debate.6 Recent scholarship further
3. Scholars have used various terms to describe this phenomenon. Roberta Romano uses
the term "law as a product" to describe what states that seek corporate charters are selling.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Piecesof the IncorporationPuzzle, I J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225, 225 (1985). Professors Eisenberg and Miller refer to such competition as a "market
for contracts." Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Marketfor Contracts 3 (N.Y.U.
Center for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 06-45, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=938557.
4. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevantfor
CorporateGovernance?,21 OxFORD REv. ECON. POL'Y 212,217-18 (2005) (discussing homestate steps to retain corporate charters); see also Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara,
Corporationsand the Marketfor Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 661, 701 ("There is... evidence
that states use antitakeover statutes to attract incorporations, and competing evidence that firms
are seeking flexible rules and high-quality judicial systems."). Others have analyzed states' use
of antitakeover provisions to retain charters. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen,
Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate,46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 412-15 (2003) (discussing
statistical findings showing that "standard antitakeover statutes make[] a state more likely to
retain a local firm" but that "recapture statutes" and "staggered board statutes" do not improve
retention in a statistically significant way); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence ofAntitakeover
Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover
Overreaching,150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1801 (2002) (finding that "managers generally migrate
to antitakeover statutes"). But see Marcel Kahan, The Demandfor CorporateLaw: Statutory
Flexibility, JudicialQuality, or Takeover Protection?,22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340,363 (2006)
(concluding that antitakeover statutes have no effect on a state's retention of corporate charters).
5. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 391-94 (compiling findings indicating
that Delaware captures almost 60% of all incorporations of publicly traded firms and over 80%
of all non-home-state incorporations).
6. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalismand the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV.L. REv. 1435, 1509 (1992) (arguing
that competition leads to rules biased towards managerial interests), and William L. Cary,
Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663,665-66 (1974)
(arguing that competition results in a "race to the bottom"), with Daniel R. Fischel, The "Raceto
the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw,
76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 915-17 (1982) (challenging Cary's analysis), and Romano, supra note
3, at 280-81 (arguing that competition results in a race to the top). Both sides have marshaled
empirical evidence for their claims as to whether chartering in Delaware enhances firm value.
CompareRobert Daines, Does DelawareLaw Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,555
(2001) (finding that chartering in Delaware enhances firm value), with Lucian Bebchuk et al.,
Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in CorporateLaw?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775, 1820
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suggests that law-as-commodity competition has emerged in commercial
contracting. 7
Such competition may now be emerging in employment contracting, but
its market potential has received little consideration. There are two signs that it
is becoming increasingly important. First is the apparent growth of choice-oflaw clauses in employment contracts generally. 8 Second is the increasing
attention firms pay to choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in
noncompetition agreements and the resulting downstream litigation over such
clauses. 9 These developments are important because law-as-commodity
competition, if it takes hold in the employment context, could have dangerous
implications for workers-frustrating state-level employment law reform
efforts, and, in some instances, speeding the race to the regulatory bottom.
In this Article, I explore why this type of interjurisdictional competition is
present in the corporate area but, until recently, largely absent from
employment relationships. At a general level, distinctions in both firm- and
state-level incentives explain the difference. On the demand side, firm
managers typically are less concerned about horizontal choice-of-law
considerations in employment than in the corporate context, because state-tostate differences are usually insignificant compared to the legal risks from
federal employment law. This helps explain why arbitration clauses, which
redirect state and federal claims to a more employer-friendly forum, have
become employers' predominant litigation-risk management technique (instead
of choice-of-law or choice-of-judicial-forum clauses). On the supply side,
states have fewer incentives to promote firm selection of their employment law
extraterritorially. Such selection produces no direct revenue akin to that which
corporate chartering generates. In addition, legal decision makers may face
greater internal resistance to softening employee protections to promote their
(2002) ("[T]he evidence does not establish that Delaware incorporation produces an increase in
share value."), and Guhan Subramanian, The DisappearingDelawareEffect, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 32, 57 (2004) ("Delaware law does not improve firm value.").
7. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 17-21 (arguing that a market for contracts
has emerged in various types of major commercial contracts).
8. It would be difficult to determine how many individual employment contracts contain
choice-of-law clauses. However, the frequent inclusion of choice-of-law clauses in sample or
model contracts prepared by attorneys and others offering employers risk management advice
suggests that, at least in those employment contracts that are heavily lawyered, inclusion of such
clauses is becoming more common.
9. The enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in the NCA context is frequently litigated.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politicsin ContractualChoice ofLaw, 37 GA. L.

REv. 363, 374-76 (2003) (finding that 71 out of 697 commercial contract cases addressing
choice-of-law provisions involved NCAs). Indeed, commentary on choice-of-law clauses inthe
employment context focuses primarily on enforceability in the noncompetition area. Id. at 376.
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law than to chasing incorporations with permissive corporate law. Finally,
other states with an interest in regulating the underlying activity are far less
likely to adhere to the parties' choice of law in the employment context than in
the corporate context. Thus, because employees often control forum selection
(absent an arbitration clause), they are able to avoid the employer-preferred law
by filing in a more hospitable jurisdiction.
Upon closer examination, however, the conditions that have prevented
law-as-commodity competition in employment law are neither fundamental nor
permanent, and there are signs of a changing dynamic. Enhanced employer
demand for state employment law is likely to arise where (1) there are
substantial differences between state legal regimes, (2) these differences are
significant enough to trump employers' other employment law concerns, and
(3) employers have some confidence that they can control forum selection. A
state that establishes an employer-friendly regime may choose to compete for
interstate and out-of-state employment contracts when it perceives the benefits
of competition-pleasing home-state employers and enhanced counseling and
enforcement business-and has a judiciary both able and willing to further its
competitive aims. And, importantly, a state serious about engaging in such
competition need not rely entirely on other states' accepting the extraterritorial
application of its law. The state can attempt to force acceptance of its law
through aggressive judicial tactics, for example, by racing to judgment.
To illustrate this prospect, this Article will demonstrate the presence of
conditions favorable to law-as-commodity competition in the context of noncompetition agreements (NCAs). Significant employer demand for favorable
state law and enforcement may exist in the NCA context because application of
state NCA doctrine varies greatly, the associated legal risks to employers may
exceed all others, and enforcement of NCAs typically requires immediate
judicial (rather than arbitral) relief. Moreover, because employers typically are
the first movers in NCA litigation, they often can litigate in a hospitable judicial
forum. In addition, once domestic interest group dynamics play out and a state
emerges with an employer-friendly NCA regime, it may have powerful
incentives both to attract enforcement business into the state and to protect
home firms by offering to enforce its favorable law extraterritorially.
Furthermore, we now observe the rise of interjurisdictional disputes
involving NCA enforcement ° and, within these conflicts, judicial attempts to
10. See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2001:
Fifteenth Annual Survey, 50 AM. J. CoMp. L. 1, 26 (2002) ("[C]ases involving breach of noncompete covenants in employment contracts illustrate the temptations of forum shopping and
test the limits of interstate comity.... Litigation often follows in both states, with each state
tending to favor the local employer, which explains the incentive for a race to the courthouse.").
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preempt other courts from disregarding the parties' choice of law. The leading
example is the interjurisdictional tug-o-war in Advanced Bionics Corp. v.
Medtronic, Inc.," in which the California Supreme Court addressed the
appropriateness of a lower California court's antisuit temporary restraining
order (TRO) against Medtronic, a Minnesota firm that sought to preempt the
California action with a second action in Minnesota.' 2 Mark Stultz, a former
employee of Medtronic, and his new California-based employer, Advanced
Bionics, brought the California suit seeking a declaration that the NCA Stultz
signed with Medtronics and the choice-of-Minnesota-law clause it contained
were invalid under California law. 13 After delaying the California action by
improperly removing it to federal court,14 Medtronic filed the Minnesota action
and obtained a TRO and then a preliminary injunction enjoining Advanced
Bionics from hiring Stultz and barring both parties from seeking relief in
another court. 15 In response, Stultz and Advanced
Bionics sought and received
16
court.
California
the
from
TRO
the antisuit
On appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected the lower court's use of
the TRO. 17 Although the majority acknowledged California's strong interest in
protecting employees from NCAs,18 it concluded that California's commitment
to the norms of judicial restraint and comity rendered the antisuit TRO
improper. 9 This is in stark contrast to the approach of the Minnesota trial and
11. See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 238 (Cal. 2002)
(holding that the lower court should not have issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the defendant from proceeding in the later-filed Minnesota suit).
12. Id. at 232-35.
13. See id. at 233. The NCA almost certainly would be invalid under California law,
which broadly prohibits NCAs and unlawful restraints on trade. Id. at 237. Under Minnesota
law, the clause is more likely to be enforceable. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics
Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding Minnesota law, which disfavors
non-competition agreements but will enforce them in certain contexts, to be in conflict with
California law, which much more clearly deemed the non-competition agreement
unenforceable).
14. See Advanced Bionics, 59 P.3d at 234 (noting the federal district court's finding that
Medtronic had removed the action "for the improper purpose of avoiding an unfavorable ruling
upon a pending motion before a state court").
15. Id. at 233-34. When the Minnesota court converted the TRO into a preliminary
injunction, it failed to include the antisuit portion. Id. at 234. The court later amended its order
to include the antisuit language from the TRO. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed
the injunction. Medironic, 630 N.W.2d at 456-57.
16. Advanced Bionics, 59 P.3d at 234. The California court issued the TRO after the
federal court had remanded the matter. Id.
17. Id. at238.
18. Id. at236-37.
19. Id. at 235-38. The Court reached this conclusion despite Medtronic's behavior and
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appellate courts, which exhibited little restraint and no deference to the first-filed
California action.20 The Minnesota courts' actions suggest that they not only were
complicit in Medtronic's obstruction of the California action but also aggressively
sought to ensure extraterritorial application of Minnesota's employer-friendly NCA
law.2' While such judicial behavior does not establish that Minnesota is consciously
marketing its legal regime as a commodity, it is consistent with the incentives
described above and illustrates the role courts can play in furthering a state's
competitive aims. In this setting, comity seems to run only one way, leaving
California's public policy at risk to aggressive state-law exporters.
Using NCA enforcement as a lens, this Article explores a number of broader
themes. First, it suggests that the potential for law-as-commodity competition in
employment law extends to other contexts. 22 Conditions conducive to such
competition may emerge in several areas, including other controversial employerprotective terms, new, enhanced employee protections, and reforms that blur the
traditional lines between corporate and employment law. If these kinds of
conditions materialize, employers may deploy several strategies to manage legal
risks; among them is selecting the law ofemployer-friendly states willing to protect
their selection.
This Article then addresses how states can defend their workers and other
regulatory interests against competition-produced foreign law. 23 A state has great
freedom to reject party autonomy in law and forum selection when the
activity at issue is within its territory and the chosen law or forum defeats an
important local public policy. 24 But the lurking danger is that such freedom
will not be exercised effectively, particularly if legal decision makers fail to
recognize the threat to domestic prerogatives law-as-commodity competition
the likely contrary outcome in the Minnesota litigation.
20. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 449 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001) (concluding that "[c]omity does not require that Minnesota defer to the California
court in this matter" and that "[t]he cost to and the convenience of the litigants do not weigh
heavily in favor of deference to California").
21. In upholding the preliminary injunction, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded
that the first-filed rule is not intended to be inflexible and that Minnesota has a strong interest in
having contracts executed in the state enforced according to party expectations. Id. at 449-50.
While acknowledging that the federal court had found that Medtronic's removal was for an
improper purpose, the court rejected the argument that Medtronic acted in bad faith. Id at 450.
22. Infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2.
23. Infra Part II.B.3.
24. See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware'sVantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back in
the Post-Post-EnronEra, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 118-23 (2008) (arguing that the internal
affairs doctrine-the prevailing horizontal choice-of-law rule in the corporate context---does not
have a constitutional dimension, and states are largely free to apply their own law to corporate
relationships within firms that have substantial contacts with the forum but foreign charters).
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poses. Thus, lawmakers must be conscious of how competing jurisdictions
may seek to force adherence to their laws through aggressive judicial tactics.
For example, in Advanced Bionics, the California court should not have
ignored the Minnesota courts' behavior or the fact that Minnesota was unlikely
to exercise reciprocal restraint.
Next, states concerned about law-as-commodity competition must adopt
other enforcement strategies to counteract the threat. Among these, the most
dramatic is a shift from private enforcement to a public model, in which the
state itself enforces its legal norms against employers seeking to circumvent
them with foreign judgments. In some circumstances, the threat of public
enforcement may be the only way to deter firms from thwarting local public
policies by taking advantage of another state's aggressive competition strategy.
This Article offers important lessons regarding not only interstate struggles
to control NCA law but also law-as-commodity competition generally. The
conditions favorable to such competition are emerging in the employment
context. As they expand, states will compete for selection of their law and
encourage firms to race to their courthouses to avail themselves of it. States
that wish to maintain regulatory schemes safeguarding their workers must be
aware of the threat and respond strategically to stave off the creeping
nullification of the protections they provide.
Part II of this Article compares types of interjurisdictional competition and
considers why law-as-commodity competition is pervasive in corporate law but
is only now beginning to emerge in employment law. It explores the
contrasting incentives that have traditionally led the principal actors-firm
managers, potentially competing states, and other interested states-to behave
differently in the corporate and employment contexts. It then discusses how
these incentives may change and how managers and competing states could
overcome resistance to such competition through aggressive enforcement
tactics. Part III builds on this analysis by surveying the conditions conducive to
law-as-commodity competition in the NCA context. It begins with a discussion
of the factors that alter managerial and state incentives in this area and the ways
in which states wishing to engage in NCA enforcement competition might
overcome resistance from other states. It also explores the evidence that states
are currently engaged in such competition. Finally, Part IV turns to broader
implications, considering additional areas of employment law in which law-ascommodity competition might emerge. Further, this Part offers suggestions on
how states concerned about the threat to local interests can defend against such
competition and its effects on local workers.
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II. InterurisdictionalCompetition and the Firm
A. Competition Models Compared
Interjurisdictional competition (or "regulatory competition") involves the
deployment of legal incentives by national or subnational governments to
attract or retain benefits from firms or persons with the ability to direct their
activities or capital into the jurisdiction.2 5 In a globalizing world where capital
and commercial activities frequently cross jurisdictional borders, such
competition affects many regulatory areas governing business operations and
relationships. 26 The impact of such competition on social welfare-including
the pressure it puts on states to deregulate or soften legal enforcement-is a
matter of intense scholarly and public policy debate.27
But interjurisdictional competition can take different forms. This is true
even with regard to corporate and employment law, two regulatory areas that
have much in common: Both govern private relationships between principal
actors within business entities and, in both areas, management typically chooses
the terms governing these relationships.28
25. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 1, at 992-93 ("Countries now have an incentive to
compete for business by altering their domestic regulations in order create a regulatory
environment that business will find attractive. This... has been termed 'regulatory
competition."').
26. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread ofAt- Will Employment Doctrineas an
Inter-JurisdictionalRace-to-the-Bottom ofEmployment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REv. 453,464
(2008) (noting that scholars have found effects of competition on trust, banking, environmental,
tax, local government, property, bankruptcy, and family law areas); id at 469-71 (describing an
international race to the bottom in labor regulation); Stone, supra note 1, at 992-93 (noting
prior scholars' concerns that regulatory competition will affect banking, environmental
regulation, products liability, tort law, and labor standards); Stone, Yukon and Beyond, supra
note 2, at 95-96 (positing that international regulatory competition affects labor standards).
27. In Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,541 (1933) (upholding a Florida statute
that imposed a flat tax on opening and maintaining stores against an equal protection clause
challenge despite the fact that the tax did not adjust to the amount or value of each store's
business), Justice Brandeis observed the deregulatory effect ofintejurisdictional competition in
the corporate context, stating: "Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in
charters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.... The race was one not
of diligence but of laxity." Id. at 557-59 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). William Cary initiated the
scholarly discussion of the competition-induced "race for the bottom" in the corporate context.
Cary, supra note 6, at 705. Today, whether interjurisdictional competition produces socially
beneficial outcomes remains a matter of great scholarly disagreement in many areas, including
employment. See, e.g., ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW 8-11 (2007) (discussing the debate over globalization and
whether it has spawned a race to the bottom in the labor context); Stone, Shadow of
Globalization,supra note 2, at 1-3 (same).
28. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
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As an initial matter, discussions regarding interjurisdictional competition
in these two areas have focused on different levels of government. In the
employment law context, domestic state-versus-state competition garners some
scholarly attention, 29 but the principal contemporary public policy concern is
international competition.30 In corporate law, interstate rather than international
competition for corporate charters has been the primary subject of scholarly
interest, 3' although, recently, the potential for American-style charter
competition among member states of the European Union and international
competition
for securities regulation have become matters of heightened
32
interest.
Dilutionof Employee BargainingPower Via StandardForm Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REv. 963, 963-64, 977-80 (discussing management's substantial advantages at the formation
stage of employment relationships); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:
ArbitrationAgreements andNon-Compete Covenants as a HybridForm of Employment Law,
155 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 392 (2006) [hereinafter Estlund, Between Rights and Contract]

(discussing lower-level employees' limited bargaining power); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuildingthe
Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 CoLuM. L. REv. 319, 340 (2005)

(observing that employers typically impose arbitration clauses on employees without
negotiation); Glynn, supra note 24, at 102 (describing managers as "the prime movers in
chartering decisions").
29. See, e.g., Bales, supranote 26, at 455 (arguing that at-will employment spread due to
competition for capital among under-industrialized states).
30. See, e.g., id. at 469-71 (describing an international race to the bottom in labor
regulation); Stone, supra note 1, at 990-97 (discussing the labor regulation concerns
globalization raises). American states undoubtedly engage in interjurisdictional competition to
increase employment by drawing business into the jurisdiction, as evidenced by the fact that
states have touted their business-friendly employment law norms over the past century to attract
business activities. Id. at 990-9 1. However, states also utilize tax breaks and other enticements
external to employment law to attract such business activities. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen,
supra note 4, at 421 (discussing other factors that make states attractive to firms, including
adoption of the uniform Model Business Corporation Act and the use of antitakeover statutes).
Softening or manipulating basic employment law standards-which, as discussed below, are
relatively permissive and uniform-is not the primary mechanism states utilize to compete for
employment-producing business activities.
31. See supra note 6 (citing literature regarding the race to the bottom/race to the top
debate incorporate law, which focuses almost exclusively on competition between states).
32. A wave of charter competition scholarship followed the European Court of Justice's
1999 decision in CentrosLtd. v. Erhvervs-ogSelskabsstyrelsen, Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-

1459 (ruling that one member country cannot "refuse to register a branch of a company" formed
under the laws of another country, even when that company carries out no business in its
formation country and seeks to conduct "its entire business in the [country] in which the branch
is sought."). See, e.g., Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4, at 707-08 (discussing the increased
charter competition following Centros). Recent scholarship has also focused on the potential
for interjurisdictional competition among nations in the securities arena. See, e.g., id. at 710
("[The international market for securities regulations threatens continued dominance of the
U.S. federal role in securities regulation.").
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Yet the underlying nature of the competition in these areas also differs.
Interjurisdictional competition in the employment law context typically
involves the states (most notably nation-states, but also American states)
competing for business by adopting or weakening labor and employment
standards to attract or retain capital investment.33 Such regulatory competition
and its effects-e.g., outsourcing, wage pressures, declining union densityoften are at the center of debates regarding the effects of globalization and free
trade on worker welfare.34
In the corporate area, the discussion regarding interjurisdictional
competition typically addresses something different: Competition between
states to attract or retain business entity charters, potentially independent of the
location of operations. 35 In other words, some states seek to profit not from
drawing firm operations into their territory, but rather by granting legal
recognition and a set of corresponding stakeholder rights and duties to firms
that may have little or no operational contact with the jurisdiction.36
In a sense, this type of regulatory competition produces a law-ascommodity business. By granting entity charters (for corporations, limited
partnerships, LLCs, etc.), a state can "sell" its entity law to firms operating
completely outside of its borders. 37 With Delaware's emergence as the
dominant producer of state-level corporate law norms, such regulatory

33. See Stone, Shadow of Globalization,supranote 2, at 1 (noting that some race-to-thebottom theorists argue that globalization will lead nation-states to "relax[] or repeal[] labor
protections to attract firms and jobs"); Stone, supra note 1, at 992 ("Countries do not have an
incentive to compete for business by altering their domestic relations in order to create a
regulatory environment that business will find attractive."). For a discussion of the literature
addressing "competitive federalism," and the role of law in inducing jurisdictional entry or exit,
see Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 1095, 1100-07 (1996).
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing how global competition affects
labor standards, unions, and overall worker welfare).
35. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 384 ("[M]ost scholars [assume] ... that
states seek to attract incorporations.").
36. See Cary, supranote 6, at 668-69 (discussing Delaware's competitive efforts to create
a favorable climate for businesses to incorporate there, even though they may operate
elsewhere).
37. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1461, 1505-06 (1989) ("A small state has a very strong financial incentive to design a corporate
law regime that will sell-that is, a regime that will attract incorporation."); see also Comment,
Lawfor Sale: A Study of the DelawareCorporationLaw of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 861
(1969) ("Delaware is in the business of selling its corporation law."); cf Robert Daines, The
IncorporationChoices oflPOFirms,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1603 (2002) (concluding that ifa
state developed a new rule firms found beneficial, Delaware could adopt that rule and prevent
corporations from migrating to the other state).
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38
competition has played a key role in the evolution of American corporate law.
It also lies at the center of the corporate law "race to the bottom/race to the top"
debate that has produced a sprawling body of literature over the last halfcentury.39
When I refer to "competition" for corporate or entity law, I am not
suggesting that a broadly competitive or efficient market exists. On the
contrary, Delaware has unique historical and other advantages that largely
preclude other states from competing effectively against it to export corporate
law. 40 Nor is the location of primary firm operations irrelevant in this market.
Because of Delaware's dominant position, competition in the market for
publicly traded firms is largely limited to two sellers: Delaware and a firm's
"home state" (place of operations). 4' And home state competition is largely
reactive: These states modify their law structures simply to avoid losing
charters of home-state firms to Delaware.42 Law-as-commodity competitionas I use the term-therefore can exist even if only one state is able or willing to
promote its law extraterritorially on a wide scale.
Because this type of competition has yet to come to fruition in the
employment context, the distinction between the employment and corporate
areas is stark. Interjurisdictional competition with regard to the former involves
attracting operations to the state, while competition with regard to the latter

38.

See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32

J.CORP. L. 33, 37 (2006) (observing that states had the power to respond to Delaware's success
by monopolizing charters within their own borders, but instead "foreswore" those monopolies,
making Delaware "the primary purveyor of corporate charters").
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (outlining the literature and arguments
central to this debate); see also Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 384-85 (discussing the
academic arguments on each side of the race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top debate); cf Erin Ann
O'Hara, Opting Out ofRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis of ContractualChoiceofLaw, 53

L. REv. 1551, 1569-72 (2000) (discussing the academic debate over whether party
choice-of-law in general leads to a race-to-the-top or race-to-the-bottom).
VAND.

40. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk& AssafHamdani, Vigorous Race orLeisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 615 (2002)

(finding that other states pose no real "competitive threat to Delaware's dominant position");
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth ofState Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 679, 748 (2002) (concluding that other states' attempts to compete with Delaware are
ultimately futile).

41. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supranote 4, at 420 (noting that companies generally choose
either Delaware or their home state as their place of incorporation); Daires, supra note 37, at
1600 (same); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 15-16 (same).
42.

See, e.g., Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 701 (noting that corporate law

innovations spread through the states, with other states seeking to avoid losing firms to
Delaware); Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State
Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 214 ("[G]iven Delaware's

leading position, other states are engaged in... 'defensive' competition.").
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does not (at least not necessarily) because it can be achieved through the
parties' selection of foreign state law to govern firm activities or relationships.
To this extent, these models of competition stand at opposite ends of a
spectrum of operational contacts between the firm and the state.
Forms of interjurisdictional competition also may occupy an intermediate
position. Because of prevailing choice-of-law rules and other limiting
conditions, a state's ability to market its law for extraterritorial use may depend
on the number of connections--operational or otherwise-it has with parties
wishing to take advantage of it.43 Where such conditions are present, a state
can engage in law-as-commodity competition only to the extent that purchasing
firms have some relationship to the state. Relatedly, a state's competitive
position in the market for firm operations may be bolstered if the law it
promulgates to attract investment will govern at least some firm activities
occurring elsewhere. In other words, one enticement states can offer to attract
or retain business activities is a willingness to extend domestic law to the
extraterritorial activities of firms with local contacts. By promoting and then
enforcing the selection of its law by entities with at least some contacts with the
jurisdiction, a state therefore may engage in a limited form of law-ascommodity competition as part of its strategy to attract or retain business
investment. 44
While these models may work concomitantly, their relationship may also
be inverse. If firms with limited or no operational contact with a state
supplying favorable law are unable to take advantage of it-i.e., another
jurisdiction prohibits them from choosing foreign law to govern activities
within its borders-then they have stronger incentives to relocate some or all of
their operations or activities to the supplier state.45 If, on the other hand,
background legal principles facilitate extraterritorial application of favorable
46
law, firms may have fewer incentives to move their operations or activities.
43. See Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 672 (stating that enforcement of choice-oflaw clauses typically depends on the parties' contacts with the law of the chosen state and the
states whose laws they seek to avoid).
44. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 33-34 (finding that, as part of New York's
efforts to attract commercial contracting, New York courts consider a choice-of-law clause itself
to constitute sufficient contact with the state to warrant enforcement and give such clauses
"nearly absolute respect" in commercial litigation).
45. See Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4, at 669-72 (noting that firms seeking to use the
law of a state to which they have no connection might be willing to move if the connection
requirement imposed by the non-competing state where their operations are located forces them
to do so); Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara, From Politicsto Efficiency in Choiceof Law, 67
U. Cin. L. REv. 1151, 1162 (2000) (same).
46. See Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 45, at 1162 (stating that the cost of exit would be
low if firms could continue to reside in one state while being governed by another's law).
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We observe the latter phenomenon in the corporate area: Because they do not
have to, American business entities do not move their headquarters or
operations to take advantage of more favorable legal standards.4 7 Promoters
simply charter their entities in favorable jurisdictions.48
If legal and other conditions are conducive, broad-based, law-ascommodity competition may supplant the market for operations. Assuming all
else is equal, 49 export-style competition may be more attractive because it is
cheaper and easier for both the purchaser (the firm) and the supplier (the
competing state) of such law. On the demand side, because firms select
favorable law without having to relocate their operations, they can take
advantage of such law either at a lower cost or in circumstances in which they
otherwise could not have done so. 50 On the supply side, a state selling law
extraterritorially may be able to externalize many of the costs of its law,
because the on-the-ground application is outside of its territory.5 Moreover,
unless the state where activities actually occur intervenes-say, by refusing to
enforce the choice of foreign law-a firm's selection of foreign law results in
its application, carving the preferences of that state out of the equation, even
though it may bear many (or all) of the costs.
For these reasons, those who believe that interjurisdictional competition to
attract business activity or capital produces a socially harmful race to the
regulatory bottom should recognize that the law-as-commodity model is of
potentially greater concern. Because of both the incentives it creates and its
means of adoption and distribution, such competition may spread the legal
norms preferred by firm decision makers more quickly and effectively, thereby
accelerating the race. It is therefore worth exploring why this type of
interjurisdictional competition has not previously taken off in the employment

47. See id. (noting that firms are generally governed by the law of the state in which they
choose to incorporate, thus resulting in a less conventional form of choice of law).
48. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at 568 ("Delaware, where approximately
58% of public companies incorporate, is the state of location for less than 0.9% of publicly
traded companies.").
49. I realize this is a big assumption, at least from the supply side, because the operations
model often would produce greater benefits for the supplying state (i.e., jobs and tax revenue)
than the law-as-commodity model would. These types of supply-side incentives are discussed in
the next section.
50. See supranote 46 and accompanying text (noting that firms' costs decrease when they
do not have to relocate to be governed by favorable foreign law).
51. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAiLuRE OF CORPORATE LAw 114 (2006) (stating that
states' decisions to market their law are facilitated by the presence of externalities-costs of
decisions that the states will not bear and thus do not have to account for).
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law context and remains largely unconsidered in the literature, while, in
corporate law, it has had such a profound impact.
B. Employment and CorporateLaw Compared
Many incentives that drive law-as-commodity interjurisdictional
competition in the corporate area have not been present in the employment law
context. Although favorable law always has value, the powerful demand- and
supply-side incentives that compel firms to select foreign corporate law and
states to "sell" it are either dampened or absent in the employment area. For
related reasons, states have generally been far less willing to allow foreign
employment law norms to govern employment and other working relationships
within their borders than the corporate
law norms that govern relationships
52
between shareholders and managers.
None of this is particularly surprising given the distinct histories,
structures, and subjects of these two regulatory areas. Yet, upon closer
examination, the conditions that have historically discouraged law-ascommodity competition in the employment area are neither fundamental nor
permanent. And, as revealed in both this section and the next, these conditions
may not prevail in all employment contexts. Indeed, significant changes in
state employment law norms could usher in competition in various
employment-related regulatory areas.
1. Demand-Side Incentivesfor Firms to Choose Legal Regimes
In one important respect, the demand-side incentives that might foster lawas-commodity interjurisdictional competition in the employment and corporate
areas are the same. Given their position within the firm structure, superior
bargaining power, repeat-player status, and access to risk expertise and
resources, management is usually the prime mover in choosing the terms
governing a firm's internal "corporate" relationships (the relationships between
and among shareholders, directors, and officers) and what terms will govern
firm employment relationships.53 And, the basic inducement that drives
52. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing states' reluctance to allow foreign employment law to
govern).
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the disparity in bargaining
power and authority between managers and lower-level employees); see also Samuel
Issacharoff, Contractingfor Employment: The LimitedReturn of the Common Law, 74 TEx. L.
REv. 1783, 1795 (1996) (focusing on the disparity in bargaining power between managers and
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management's incorporation decision-finding a source of favorable and
predictable law to govern internal corporate relationships-is present with
regard to firm employment relationships, particularly in business entities
operating in multiple jurisdictions. 54 In many firms, and particularly those that
are closely held, the legal and business risks associated with employment
relationships exceed those arising from the relationship between investors and
managers. 55 Moreover, most employees are not inherently better positioned
56
than shareholders to resist management's pursuit of preferred terms.
But focusing solely on management's incentives would be an
oversimplification. In all but the smallest firms, management's decisionmaking regarding the selection of contract terms may be influenced greatly by
legal counsel. 57 As scholars have noted in the corporate area, counsel's
familiarity with local law produces a natural preference for it.58 Thus, despite
Delaware's advantages, this contributes to a significant bias towards home-state
entity chartering. 59 In both the corporate and employment areas, counsel is

employees in establishing the parameters of employment).
54. See Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4, at 668-69 (stating that firms seek a system of
law that will predictably enforce their contracts and that this concern is particularly important to
firms that deal with a diverse array of parties); see also Daines, supra note 37, at 1565 ("[Both
sides of the race debate] agree[] that... firms... search [for and] select the regime with the
most favorable legal rules.").
55. While rules governing managers' and shareholders' fiduciary duties to one another are
significant in the context of closely-held businesses, corporate litigation involving such
businesses is unlikely to occur repeatedly. Glynn, supranote 24, at 131. Employment law, on
the other hand, creates the ongoing risk of liability. See Adele Nicholas, GCs Reveal Their
Litigation Fears and Headaches,CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2004, at 72 (indicating that sixtytwo percent of corporate general counsel surveyed ranked labor and employment litigation as
their number one potential exposure).
56. Employees usually have inferior bargaining power to management. See supra note 28
and accompanying text (noting the significant disparity in bargaining power between
management and employees).
57.

See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Towardan Interest-GroupTheory of

DelawareCorporateLaw, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469, 486 (1987) ("The most influential advisors to
corporate management are generally the firm's lawyers. The incorporation decision is heavily
dependent on the different legal environments within which the firm could operate, which is
dependent on the particular expertise of the firm's legal counsel.").
58. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4, at 399 ("[Iln-state incorporation would
provide [a] local law firm with an advantage over out-of-state law firms that might compete for
the firm's business, as the local law firm would be likely to have greater familiarity with the
home state's corporate law and better connections in the state."). Home-state law firms might
also direct clients to incorporate in-state to position themselves for any future litigation. Id.
59. See Daines, supra note 37, at 1559 (finding that there is a "substantial home-state
advantage" in terms of where firms initially choose to incorporate).
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unlikely to recommend the law of a foreign jurisdiction to govern firm
relationships absent compelling business or legal reasons for doing so.
For a number of reasons, however, counsel is more likely to consider and
recommend foreign corporate law than foreign employment law. One is purely
practical: To form any business entity that enjoys limited liability (e.g., a
corporation, LLC, or limited partnership), promoters must seek a charter from
an appropriate state authority.6 ° Chartering therefore mandates an initial choice
of a state and, pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, its entity law to govern
the "corporate contract." In the employment context, no such initial choice is
required. Indeed, the parties usually do not spell out any of the terms of their
at-will--dampens
relationship, in part because the default rule-employment
6
employers' incentives to contract explicitly. '
Disparate histories and practice traditions also play a role. Interstate
charter competition has existed for nearly a century, and with it, as described
below, a choice-of-law regime that allows firm promoters to select foreign
corporate law largely unimpeded. 62 While entity-law norms are now relatively
uniform across states as a result of charter competition, such competition
emerged because of significant substantive differences between states.63 Thus,
corporate attorneys traditionally have felt a need to be familiar with their home
state's corporate law, Delaware law, and perhaps the law of additional states.
Indeed, selecting among the chartering options is one important aspect of what
corporate counselors do.
State employment law, on the other hand, began the last century as largely
uniform, with a strong presumption of at-will employment dominating the legal
landscape. 64 Only recently have employment law norms diverged in a variety
60. Owners of unchartered enterprises, such as general partnerships, do not enjoy limited
liability. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERsHIP ACT § 306 (1997) (stating that partners in a general
partnership are jointly and severally liable for partnership obligations).
61. See Bales, supranote 26, at 454-55 (discussing the rise of at-will employment and the
subsequent desirability of employers taking advantage of it). In light of the differing character
of the steps required for formation, the genesis of the corporation and the legal rules that will
govern internal corporate relationships will be, on balance, more considered-and highly
lawyered-than the birth of many employment relationships.
62. See Tung, supranote 38, at 36 (noting the "widespread acceptance" of permitting the
law of a firm's state of incorporation to govern); see also Daines,supranote 37, at 1560 ("Firms
can elect to be governed by any... regime[] simply by incorporating in the state of their
choice."); Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 690-91 (discussing how choice-of-law clauses
are more frequently enforced now than they traditionally were).
63. See Tung, supranote 38, at 74 (discussing New Jersey's modification of its corporate
law to attract incorporation by out-of-state firms).
64. See Bales, supra note 26, at 458 (noting that at-will employment was widespread at
the turn of the twentieth century and nearly universal by the 1930s).
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of potentially important ways-e.g., the greater willingness of some states to
impose contractual, tort, and statutory limits on the at-will doctrine and some
material differences in other regimes, including workers' compensation and
wage and hour protections. 65 And, as discussed below, unlike in the corporate
law context, states historically have been reluctant to apply foreign law to
domestic employment relationships.66 In light ofthese substantive differences,
there has been less need for ex ante counseling in the employment context, and
counsel advising firm management at the outset of employment relationships
traditionally has had fewer reasons to worry about other states' law.
Even today, with employment relationships becoming more heavily
lawyered, there remain substantive and structural differences between corporate
and employment law that create disparate incentives. This is not because of
greater uniformity in employment law; indeed, the divergence of some
employment law norms may mean that the opposite is true. The doctrinal
differences in both contexts are on the margins: Given the nearly universal
adherence to employment at-will and the convergence of corporate and entity
law, state legal norms in both the corporate and employment areas are largely
uniform. Yet the marginal differences between states with regard to corporate
law are more important than those in employment law in light of the nature and
importance of the federal law in the two areas. And, relatedly, state-to-state
differences in enforcement are more paramount in the corporate context.
Both corporate and employment law in the United States have federal- and
state-law components, but the substance and structure of these components
differ materially. Despite periodic expansions, including in the post-Enron
period, federal corporate law (i.e., securities law) remains primarily concerned
with disclosure obligations of publicly traded firms.67 Thus, although federal
securities law creates potentially enormous legal risks for some corporate
actors, these risks have been limited largely to disclosure and anti-fraud
matters. Moreover, because of their distinctiveness and jurisdictional
65. See, e.g., Stone, supranote 1, at 990-91 ("[C]orporations began moving to the South
in search of lower wages and lower unionization rates in the 1920s. In more recent years,
corporate flight has been motivated by additional factors such as avoiding state worker
compensation systems, state unemployment insurance programs, and other labor protective
programs."). For a general discussion of the history of state and federal employment regulation,
see TIoTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITs LIMITATIONS
xxv-xxxvi (2007).
66. Infra Part II.B.3.
67. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities
and Exchange Commission Takes Chargeof CorporateGovernance,30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79,80
(2005) ("The federal securities laws generally have been considered full disclosure statutes, as
opposed to merit regulation statutes or laws governing the internal affairs of corporations.").
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are often enforced and litigated separately
considerations, securities matters
6
from state corporate law issues. 8
State corporate law governs most substantive rights and obligations of
shareholders, directors, and officers--e.g., voting rights and fiduciary duties.
Managers therefore have strong incentives to control legal risks through the
selection of favorable state law. This is true even though state corporate law
has converged over time. As a number of scholars have suggested, although
the basic rules governing corporate law do not vary greatly, important
differences in potential application and enforcement of such terms remain.69
Incorporators find Delaware preferable because its vast body ofjudge-made law
provides predictability not available elsewhere. 70 At the same time, this law is
flexible enough to adjust to particular circumstances. 7' Moreover, at least for
some firms, enforcement mechanisms may be a key determinant of whether a
state's regulatory environment is attractive. 72 With the chartering decision
comes the ability to choose among states with more- or less-favorable
enforcement schemes. Here, again, Delaware offers a powerful enticement to
firms. Its Court of Chancery is known as an efficient, expert court system, with
no juries and appellate review by a supreme court also well-versed in corporate
law issues.73 Moreover, Delaware courts are perceived by critics and

68. See Joel Seligman, The New CorporateLaw, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1993) (noting
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a substantial number of securities claims);
see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts for
violations of securities exchange laws under that chapter); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)
(2000) (providing for the preemption and removal to federal court of certain securities-fraud
class actions).
69. See Glynn, supra note 24, at 104-07 (reviewing the literature addressing the unique
way Delaware applies and enforces its corporate law to help it attract business).
70. See Daines, supra note 37, at 1583 (stating that other states are "less likely able to
develop a distinctive and predictable body of case law" compared to Delaware); Glynn, supra
note 24, at 100 (citing that other states cannot easily duplicate Delaware's "corporate decisional
law"); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalismand the Structure of

CorporateLaw, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1591 (2005) ("In Delaware, judge-made law, to the
virtual exclusion of statutory law, governs fundamental issues such as fiduciary duties of
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, the prerequisites for a derivative suit, and
disclosure obligations.").
71. Glynn, supra note 24, at 100 n.44; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 70, at 1598
(describing the judge-made elements of Delaware corporate law as "flexible and highly factintensive" and able to adapt to new or changed circumstances).
72. Glynn, supra note 24, at 100-01.
73. See, e.g., Curtis Alva, Delawareand the Marketfor CorporateCharters,15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (noting that Delaware judges are very skilled and the court system is
very efficient); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts,91 COLuM. L. REv. 193 1,
1963 (1991) (stating that Delaware has "expert courts" for corporate matters).
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supporters alike as adhering, on balance, to norms that favor managerial
prerogatives. 74
It is worth noting that these enforcement-related incentives are not limited
to the corporate context. For example, in their recent work on the market for
commercial contracts, Professors Eisenberg and Miller observe a similar
phenomenon with regard to New York's specialized business court: It is
perceived in the market as efficient and predictable in handling major
commercial matters. 7
State law also governs critical aspects of the employment relationship,
and, again, some important differences between the laws of various states have
emerged. However, in contrast to corporate law, a wide range of substantive
employment law obligations are federal in nature.76 For example, in the private
sector, federal law is the primary source of wage and hour mandates, workplace
safety standards, and antidiscrimination protections, 77 and, given its broad,
preemptive sweep, federal law also is the predominant source of labor and
employee benefits regulation.78 Unsurprisingly then, a large number of
employment-related lawsuits contain one or more federal claims.79
The paramount importance of federal employment law norms may explain
why contemporary discussions of interjurisdictional competition in the
employment context often focus on the international competition.80 It also
74. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 73, at 1963 ("[Delaware] corporate law [is] generally
favorable toward management prerogative"); see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 40, at
599-601 (suggesting that Delaware law tends to favor management).
75. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 42-43. Faced with a decline in commercial
litigation, in 1995, New York added to its Supreme Court the Commercial Division, a
specialized trial court with expert judges selected for their business experience. Id. The
Commercial Division has enabled New York to remain competitive in the market for
commercial contracts. Id.
76. See, e.g., GLYNN ET AL., supra note 65, at xxv-xxxvi (citing many federal laws that
govern employment). State counterparts often exist, but they largely mimic the federal
standards. Id.
77. See id. at xxvi (giving examples of how federal legislation governs wage and hour
law, workplace safety standards, and antidiscrimination protections).
78. See id. at 754-76 (discussing ERISA preemption and its implications); Stephen F.
Befort & Brian N. Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law Preemption: A Critique of
Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 107, 109-19 (2004) (discussing the scope of
preemption under the NLRA).
79. See Michael D. Moberly, ProceedingGeometrically: RethinkingParallelState and
FederalEmployment Discrimination Litigation, 18 WHrrrIER L. REv. 499, 502-03 (1997)
(stating plaintiffs can and often do pursue state and federal employment law claims
simultaneously in one action).
80. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (stating that international competition
is "the principal contemporary public policy concern" in employment law).
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explains why controlling horizontal choice of law may be perceived as less
valuable in this area than others.
In part because of federal law's paramount role, arbitration clauseswhich redirect both state and federal claims to a more hospitable forum8 '-have
become employers' primary litigation-risk management device. 2 Like the
Delaware courts and New York commercial courts, arbitration offers
management an adjudicatory forum with no jury, expert decision makers,
quicker and more efficient dispute resolution than judicial proceedings, and
severe limits on employee appeals to potentially favorable fora.83 Some also
argue that mandatory arbitration is subject to a structural bias towards4
employers, although there are some contrary data on substantive outcomes.8
Arbitration clauses offer the further, substantial benefit of potentially defeating
attempts by plaintiffs' counsel to aggregate employee claims, 85 something that
81. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000), is a "super-statute" that makes
agreements to arbitrate-rather than litigate--state and federal statutory employment claims
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" unless the agreement is otherwise revocable at law or in
equity (e.g., if the agreement is unconscionable, entered into by a minor, or induced by duress).
See id. § 2 (establishing the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration
agreements); see also, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001)
(noting that "there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions" and that the
Court has previously held "that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the [Federal
Arbitration Act]"); Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) (noting that
arbitration clauses are generally enforceable with some exceptions).
82. Although only a minority of businesses require employees to arbitrate disputes, the
use of arbitration agreements has grown dramatically in recent years. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel,
When Suing Your Boss Is not an Option, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at Dl (estimating that 1520% of businesses require arbitration, which is up from 10% in 1995); cf Theodore Eisenberg,
et al., Arbitration'sSummer Soldiers: An EmpiricalStudy ofArbitrationClausesin Consumer
andNonconsumerContracts9 (Dec. 18,2007) (unpublished draft, on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract= 1076968 (discussing two empirical
studies finding arbitration agreements in 41.6% and 37% of senior and executive employment
contracts, respectively).
83. See Samuel Estreicher, PredisputeAgreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1349-51 (1997) (stating arbitration is "less expensive, more
expeditious, less draining and divisive, ... yet still effective," and noting that many firms desire
limited ex post judicial review).
84. See Katherine V.W. Stone, MandatoryArbitrationoflndividualEmployment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contractof the 1990s, 73 DENv.U. L. REv. 1017, 1050 (1996) ("[Mandatory
arbitration) channel[s] disputes into a legalistic maze... at the end of which the worker,
exhausted, demoralized, and dispirited, finds she has lost whatever rights she once believed
were worth seeking."); see also Estreicher, supra note 83, at 1355 (discussing, in disagreement,
scholars' criticisms of employment arbitration). For empirical evidence suggesting arbitration
outcomes may be more favorable to employees, see Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLuM. HuMAN RTS. L. REv. 29, 49-50 (1998)
(agreeing that arbitration should be allowed for federal securities claims).
85. That is, mandatory arbitration clauses divert claims to individual arbitration,
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is not an issue in breach of fiduciary duty cases involving large corporations,
since they must be pursued derivatively. 86 Also, because courts enforce
arbitration clauses in the run of cases, management is likely to perceive such
clauses ex ante as far less likely to succumb to judicial preferences for
nonenforcement than choice-of-law and choice-of-judicial-forum clauses.
These employer incentives are consistent with the findings of Professors
Eisenberg and Miller in their empirical study of arbitration and choice-of-law
clauses in commercial contracts.87 In that study, they found employment
contracts contained a higher density of arbitration clauses than all other types of
contracts.88 At the same time, while New York and Delaware attract the bulk
of commercial contracts, 89 there is no such trend with regard to choice of law in
employment contracts. 90 Correspondingly, employment contracts were the only
category in which neither New York nor Delaware was the supplier of
9
choice g-that
is, although choice-of-law clauses are being deployed in
employment contracts, they tend to specify a state with a substantial connection
to the employment relationship. Thus, while Eisenberg and Miller suggest that
a market for contracts has emerged with regard to some types of commercial
agreements,92 no such market has yet appeared for employment contracts.
precluding employee class actions under state or federal law. Cf. Eisenberg et al., supra note
82, at 7 (concluding from empirical data that mandatory arbitration in consumer and
employment contracts is designed to circumvent aggregation).
86. Interestingly, however, powerful corporate constituencies have begun pushing for the
ability of publicly traded firms to include in their certificate arbitration clauses for federal
securities claims-which, under current law, often are brought as class actions. See, e.g.,
Comm. ON CAPITAL MKT. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE ON CAPITAL
MARKETS REGULATION
109-11 (2006), http://crapo.senate.gov/documents/committee_

capmarkets-reg.pdf.
87. In their study of mandatory arbitration clauses, Professors Eisenberg and Miller
examined 2,758 commercial contracts attached to companies' SEC filings during 2002.
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The FlightFrom Arbitration:An EmpiricalStudy of
Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-HeldCompanies'Contracts,56 DEPAuLL. REv. 335,
348 (2007).
88. Id. at 351 tbl.2. Mandatory arbitration clauses were present in 41 of 111-36.940/-of the employment contracts examined, the highest concentration of any ofthe twelve classes of
contracts in the study. Id. By contrast, just 10.65% of the overall study set contained
mandatory arbitration clauses. Id.
89. Parties engaged in commercial transactions select the law of these states even in the
absence of another substantial connection to them. See id. at 354 (explaining that 61% of
commercial contracts choose New York or Delaware law).
90. Id. at 354-56. New York was the dominant supplier of law for several types of
contracts, but choice-of-law provisions in employment contracts demonstrated no concentration
in any state. Id. at 355.
91. Idat356fig.1.
92. See Eisenberg & Miller, supranote 3, at 49 (concluding that New York and Delaware
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Of course, arbitration and choice-of-law terms are not mutually
exclusive.93 And employment practitioner materials and standard form
employment contracts suggest that inclusion of a choice-of-law clause is now
common practice. Yet the preeminence of federal law mandates combined with
the arbitration option renders such clauses of less practical significance in many
employment relationships and resulting disputes. This explains, at least in part,
why far more judicial and scholarly ink has been spilled on arbitration clauses
in employment contracts than on choice-of-law and choice-of-judicial-forum
clauses.
In sum, the practical, historical, and structural differences between
corporate and employment law have led to greater demand for state corporate
law as a commodity than state employment law. But the employment side of
this picture might be changing. We already observe increased use of choice-oflaw clauses in employment contracts, and one can detect changes in the
underlying conditions that have inhibited demand in the employment area. For
example, the emergence of more significant differences between states, along
with the growth of worker and firm mobility, could increase demand,
particularly in circumstances in which such differences create substantial legal
risks. In addition, the use of arbitration clauses might decline if a judicial
forum becomes, for one reason or another, a better option for management and
if management is able to ensure suits are litigated in that forum. Although
genuine competition roughly akin to that in the corporate area remains only a
possibility, as discussed in Part III, we do see signs that favorable demand-side
conditions are emerging in the NCA context.
2. Supply-Side Incentivesfor States to Compete
Law-as-commodity competition will occur only when there are sufficient
supply-side benefits to induce states to sell their law. As on the demand side, at
present, there are important differences in supply-side incentives between the
corporate and employment areas.
As an initial matter, entity charters produce revenues for states in the form
of fees and recurring franchise or entity taxes.9 4 Thus, in the corporate context,
offer benefits to entice businesses to choose their law and fora in contracts).
93. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 87, at 358 (finding that there is a statistical
correlation between the choice of certain states' law (such as California's) and the presence of
mandatory arbitration clauses).
94. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 24, at 98 (stating that Delaware makes over $500 million
a year from corporate franchise taxes and fees).
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the parties' choice-of-law decision itself produces revenue for the chosen state.
If a state becomes a primary alternative choice for chartering, these revenues
can be tremendous. Delaware is the obvious example, although other states,
including Nevada, have sought to compete for charters (and revenues) in recent
years.95 Through both sheer volume and a unique franchise tax structure,
Delaware's entity taxes and fees produce approximately twenty-fivepercent of
its annual revenue.96 Delaware in particular therefore has powerful, direct
incentives to provide a favorable substantive and legal enforcement regime to
continue to attract and retain charters.
Yet a state may have other incentives to structure its legal norms or
enforcement mechanisms to persuade parties to select its law and,
correspondingly, to resolve disputes within the forum. One incentive is the
creation of work for the local legal services industry. 97 Again, in the corporate
context, Delaware is the leading example. The combination of chartering
activity and significant downstream corporate-related litigation supports a large
incorporation and corporate law industry (composed of lawyers, registered
agents, and others) in this tiny state.98
Even in a state whose corporate formation and dispute resolution industry
is economically insignificant, and hence, produces insufficient incentives to
compete with Delaware directly for out-of-state incorporations,99 local attorneys
have an incentive to push for a corporate legal regime attractive to home firms.
By doing so, local attorneys retain a greater share of the corporate counseling
and litigation business because local firms will be less likely to charter
elsewhere. This is one explanation for the supply side of the home-state verse
95. See Daines, supra note 37, at 1566 (stating that although Delaware is home to roughly
50% of Fortune 500 firms, Nevada is trying to compete for the incorporation business and
become the "'Delaware of the West"') (citations omitted).
96. Glynn, supra note 24, at 98.
97. See Macey & Miller, supra note 57, at 522 (stating that Delaware produces
"substantial revenues" by attracting chartering business); see also Glynn, supranote 24, at 99100 (stating that Delaware attorneys profit from Delaware's legal regime).
98. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 40, at 694-98 (stating that Delaware law firms
receive much greater revenues than if Delaware did not have a unique legal system that attracted
corporations); Maureen Milford, Delaware's CorporateDominanceThreatened,THE NEWS J.,
Mar. 2, 2008, available at http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080302/NEWS/803020319 (noting that when taxes from lawyers and others in Delaware's
corporate law industry are included, its charter-related business may account for 40% of state
revenue).
99. To do this, such states might have to undertake significant changes. See Daines, supra
note 37, at 1603 (discussing how a state could adopt statutory schemes in order to become more
attractive than Delaware for corporations); see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discriminationin the Marketfor CorporateLaw, 86 CoRNELL L. REv. 1205, 1213-14 (2001)
(discussing barriers to competition with Delaware).
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Delaware story in corporate law: As a result of successful local interest group
lobbying to retain home-state charters, other states generally have followed
Delaware's lead on corporate law matters, and hence, moved over time toward
a permissive regime akin to Delaware's.1°° In other words, protecting local
legal work creates incentives for other, larger states to compete for charters,
even if these incentives are more modest than Delaware's.
This explanation for why larger states would compete for legal business is
also consistent with Eisenberg and Miller's analysis of New York's incentives
to compete to be the source of law and the forum of choice for major
commercial contracts. 01' The authors detail the efforts of the New York legal
and
lobby to make changes-such as creating a business-centered court system
02
a substantively favorable commercial law-to maintain this status.1
These incentives can be contrasted with those in the employment law area.
Obviously, choice-of-law clauses in employment contracts do not produce
direct tax revenues. Moreover, although local employment law practitioners
would benefit from a state's attracting and retaining employment law
counseling and litigation work, the interest group dynamics and, hence,
legislative incentives are likely to play out very differently. While state
lawmakers in Delaware and elsewhere have faced relatively little opposition to
chasing incorporations with more permissive corporate law norms or to seeking
to attract other types of commercial contracts,103 state actors-particularly
legislators-would face far greater resistance to reforms reducing existing
employee protections. It seems highly unlikely that they would do so simply to
benefit the "employment law industry." Indeed, this may offer at least a partial
explanation for why, as Eisenberg and Miller observe, New York and Delaware
have not traditionally competed for employment contracts, while they have
sought to attract other types of major commercial contracts.i14
100. See Glynn, supranote 24, at 99-100 (noting that some scholars think there is "robust
competition" among states for corporate charters); Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4, at 699-702
(discussing the role of local lawyers in pressing for state law to retain corporate charters); cf
Macey & Miller, supra note 57, at 522-23 (concluding that the Delaware bar exerts influence
over the state's corporate lawmaking to retain charters and maximize its own revenue). Even if
other states modify their corporate statutes to attract or retain incorporations, they are unlikely to
take more costly steps to compete. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 99, at 1213 n.35 (stating
that neither Nevada, Virginia, nor Pennsylvania has instituted a specialized corporate court).
101. See Eisenberg& Miller,supra note 3, at 12 fig.2,20 fig.7 (finding that over 45% of
commercial contracts designated New York law as governing and over 40% specified New York
as the forum of choice).
102. Id. at 47-48.
103. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 24, at 99-100, 105 (discussing interest group dynamics in
Delaware and elsewhere).
104. See Eisenberg & Miller,supra note 87, at 355 (observing that unlike many other types
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Nevertheless, law-as-commodity competition may still emerge in the
employment area if it could produce other benefits to the state or other powerful
domestic constituencies.
The process might begin with traditional
interjurisdictional competition: Powerful domestic interest groups would
convince the state's legal decision makers to create an employment law
environment that attracts business investment into the state or persuades
existing firms to stay. Once this occurs, and a state emerges with an employerfriendly regulatory regime, that state will have two reasons to offer
extraterritorial application of its favorable law. First, a state competing for
business investment has an incentive to offer not only a favorable legal
environment, but also a willingness to enforce its legal rules outside of the state
for firms operating locally. In a sense, then, a state might be willing to compete
for selection of its law as part of a larger effort to attract business investment
into the state. Second, once such a regulatory environment is in place, there
may be little opposition to drawing additional legal business into the state by
marketing the state's law and willingness to enforce it to parties operating or
transacting business outside of the state. Indeed, where an employer-friendly
regime has emerged, there would be few reasons for it to withhold offering
such an enticement.
The two incentives described above are again consistent with Eisenberg
and Miller's findings. Having long been a hub for major commercial activity,
New York has natural incentives not only to maintain a favorable regulatory
environment for in-state commercial activities, but also to assist local
enterprises in taking advantage of its law for commercial activities occurring
elsewhere.10 5 Thus, commercial contracts with one or more parties
06
headquartered or operating in New York frequently designate New York law.
Yet, New York has also expanded its enforcement business to compete for
selection of its law in commercial contracts between parties with more tenuous
ties to the state. 10 7 And, it encourages parties to select its law by robustly
enforcing choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in major commercial
contracts, whether or not the parties have significant contacts with the state.'0 8
of contracts, employment contracts have low choice-of-law concentrations).
105. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 38 (stating that New York's legal and
business community would benefit from businesses being able to depend on enforceability of
choice-of-law and forum selection clauses choosing New York).
106. Id. at 12, 18.
107. Id. at 18, 33-34 (discussing New York's success attracting out-of-state contracts and
the steps it has taken to ensure application of its laws).
108. New York encourages commercial parties to specify its law and forum by generally
assuring that those choices will be honored, despite few if any other contacts with the state. See
Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 34 (stating that contracting parties' choice of New York
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New York therefore is now engaged in traditional interjurisdictional
competition for commercial activity and law-as-commodity competition for
commercial contracts.
Once domestic interest group dynamics have shaken out in the
employment context in a particular state and an employer-friendly regime has
emerged, one might expect that state to engage in the latter kind of
interjurisdictional competition. Yet there is little evidence that states with
employer-friendly legal regimes are actually competing in this way. For
example, in certain respects, New York's regulatory environment is more
employer-friendly than many other states',' °9 yet, as Eisenberg and Miller
found, New York appears not to have sought employment contract-related
business." Why New York and other states have not done so is unclear.
Perhaps relevant interest groups and lawmakers believe that such competition is
unlikely to produce significant enforcement business because of the demandside conditions described above and because out-of-state employees, absent an
arbitration clause, typically control forum selection. Perhaps this also reflects
comity concerns: Recognizing that attempts to regulate the conditions of
employment for workers in other states might elicit a far stronger negative
reaction from states than seeking to regulate other types of commercial
arrangements, lawmakers may simply refrain from doing so.
But if the relevant state actors-interest groups and legal decision
makers-saw the benefits of competing aggressively for employment law
contracts as outweighing the comity-related or other costs of doing so, they
might pursue such competition. Thus, while there are obvious reasons why a
law has been found itself to be a sufficient contact with New York to warrant enforcement of the
choice-of-law clause). Furthermore, New York law mandates enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses designating New York law in contracts for two hundred fifty thousand dollars or more,
"whether or not such contract .,.bears a reasonable relation to [New York]." N.Y. GEN. OBuG.
LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2007). The following section precludes matters from being
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds if the contract is for at least one million dollars and
if Section 5-1401 applies. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 2007).
109. New York has been unwilling to recognize a generally applicable common law public
policy exception, see, for example, Murphy v. American Home Product Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86,
89-90 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that New York courts would not recognize the same public policy
exceptions recognized in other states unless the legislature enacted such laws), and its
legislature has not provided broad statutory protections along these lines. New Jersey, on the
other hand, has long recognized the common-law public policy exception. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing a cause of action when
employee discharge is contrary to public policy). New Jersey has also enacted a statute that
provides fairly broad whistleblower and other protections. See generally Conscientious
Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -14 (2007).
110. See supranote 92 and accompanying text (stating that no market has emerged yet for
employment contracts).
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state may have a greater interest in competing in the market for corporate
contracts than for employment contracts, there may be other reasons for states
to compete for the latter. Although such competition has yet to take hold as it
has in the corporate and commercial contracting contexts, the potential exists.
3. Overcoming Resistancefrom Other States: Competition, Choice ofLaw,
and Choice of Forum
Law-as-commodity interjurisdictional competition depends on the
extraterritorial application of the chosen law. States engaging in such
competition, and firms seeking to take advantage of it, cannot ensure that this
occurs directly, because a competing state lacks the power to compel another
state to apply its law to transactions and relationships within the latter's
territory. Rather, application depends on the willingness of other states to
adhere to the contractually chosen law or on a federal mandate---constitutional
or statutory-to do so."'
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress has the authority to
enact national legislation regulating state-level choice of law.12 However,
Congress has not done so (yet) in either the corporate or employment
contexts. 113
Without a federal statutory mandate, law-as-commodity competition
emerges most easily when states adopt a choice-of-law regime that generally
applies the law chosen by the contracting parties. This type of regime prevails
in the entity-law context. In internal corporate disputes, states generally adhere
to the internal affairs doctrine, which provides that the law of the state of
incorporation governs the relationships between and among managers,

111. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study ofChoice ofLaw and Choice ofForum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies" Contracts 9
(Mar. 18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review),
availableat http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/?exclusive=filemgr.download &fileid=1 0797
(arguing that unless other courts enforce choice-of-law clauses, the chosen law is ineffective);
Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 687-89 (noting that parties including choice-of-law
provisions in their contract face difficulties in some states that do not enforce those provisions);
see also id.at 21 (suggesting that noncompeting states may enforce choice-of-law clauses
because it deters local firms from moving operations to a more friendly jurisdiction and is less
costly than deregulation).
112. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (granting Congress the authority to prescribe the effect of
judicial proceedings).
113. In another article, I suggest that Delaware and its allies may seek this kind of federal
"relief' if they perceive a genuine threat that other states might begin to regulate the internal
affairs of Delaware firms. Glynn, supra note 24, at 143.
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shareholders, and the corporation." 4 Despite some important exceptions, the
parties' choice of law (through incorporation) is widely respected both within
and outside of the jurisdiction of incorporation. This rule finds support in a
special provision in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts ofLaw,"5 and6it has
been extended to govern the internal affairs of other business entities.' 1
States typically do not extend the internal affairs doctrine to other
contractual relationships, including employment contracts." 7 More general
choice-of-law principles apply in the employment context, and, under these
terms, a forum state is far less likely to adhere to a contractual choice-of-law8
clause, particularly when important state public policies are implicated."
Many states apply Section 187 of the Restatement when parties have
contractually agreed upon a choice of law." 9 Section 187(1) provides for
114. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 2004, 52 AM.
J. COMp. L. 919, 989 (2004) [hereinafter Symeonides, 2004 Survey] (stating that the "internal
affairs" of corporations are governed by the law of the state of incorporation); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 2005, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 559, 651-52
(2005) [hereinafter Symeonides, 2005 Survey] (observing that only a few cases did not apply the
law of the state of incorporation in 2005); UNIFORM LIMITED LABIITY COMPANY ACT § 1001(a)
(1996) ("The laws of the State or other jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability
company is organized govern its organization and internal affairs .... ).
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 302 (1971) (providing that the
law of the state of incorporation will be applied to corporate rights and liabilities "except in the
unusual case" where some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties).
116. See Glynn, supra note 24, at 132 (observing that LLC statutes in New York,
California, and most other states expressly provide that charter-state law governs internal affairs
of LLCs); Ribstein &O'Hara, supra note 4, at 664-65 (stating that the lAD has been applied in
partnerships and other non-corporate business associations that were not traditionally state
creations).
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 (1971) (noting that in the
absence of a choice-of-law clause, courts will look at a variety of factors to determine which law
to apply, but the place of the employee's primary performance is often paramount); see also id.
§ 188(3) ("If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same
state, the local law of this state will usually be applied.").
118. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST,
PRESENT AND FuTuRE 63-119 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006) (stating that twenty-four
states generally follow the approach in the Second Restatement); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (stating that the law of the chosen state will be
followed unless another state has a materially greater interest in the issue). Symeonides
categorizes the remaining approaches: eleven states follow a traditional approach, ten follow a
combined modem approach, five follow a significant contacts approach, and two follow a
"better law" approach. SYMEONIDES, supra, at 63-119. Interestingly, non-enforcement of the
parties' choice of law is higher in NCA cases than in nearly all other types of commercial
contracts. See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 376 (stating that the parties' choice of law was not
enforced in twenty-nine out of seventy-one NCA cases).
119. See Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1992: Observations
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enforcement of contractual choice of law in situations where "the parties[']
[dispute] could have [been] resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue."020 However, if Section 187(1) is inapplicable-that is,
the chosen law is inconsistent with a mandate of the jurisdiction whose law
otherwise would have applied-courts will still generally enforce choice-of-law
clauses unless one of two conditions is met.' 2' First, a court will not enforce
the parties' choice of law if neither the parties nor the transaction has a
"substantial connection" with the chosen state and "there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice."' 22 In addition, a court may refuse to uphold the
parties' choice of law if it would be contrary to a fundamental policy of another
state which has a "materially greater interest" than the chosen state and the
other state "would be the state 23of applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties."1
Courts in those jurisdictions that have not adopted Section 187 tend to
apply interest-based choice-of-law analyses that impose similar limitations on
party autonomy. For example, some jurisdictions will not enforce a choice-oflaw provision in an employment contract if the effect would violate a local
fundamental public policy. 24 In addition, a few jurisdictions have statutory
and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 125, 136 (1994) (stating that fifteen states still follow the
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws); see also SYMEONIDES, supra note 118, at 63-119
(stating that twenty-four states generally follow the approach in the Second Restatement);
Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An EmpiricalStudy, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 357, 357 (1992) (stating that thirty-six states have adopted some alternative to the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws that focus on "interests" and "significant relationships");
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2006: Twentieth Annual
Survey, 54 AM. J. COMp. L. 697, 713 tbl.1 (2006) [hereinafter Symeonides, 2006Survey] (citing
twenty-three states that follow the Second Restatement); Symeon C. Symeonides, Judicial
Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A MixedBlessing,56 MD.L. REv. 1248, 1260
n.96 (1997) (stating that many states follow the Second Restatement in this regard even when
they have not formally adopted the Second Restatement).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTOF LAWS § 187(l)(1971). Whether the contract
was validly formed is assumed in this formulation, although that too may be an issue in some
circumstances. See William J. Woodward, Jr., ConstrainingOpt-Outs: Shielding LocalLaw
and Those It Protectsfrom Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 9, 17-20
(2006) (stating that the issue of whether the contract was validly formed is "scarcely addressed
anywhere").
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
122. Id.§ 187(2)(a).
123. Id.§ 187(2)(b); see also Mark Kantor, The Scope of Choice-of-Law Clauses, 119
BANKING L.J. 724, 726 (2002) (discussing application of Section 187(2)); Symeonides, 2005
Survey, supra note 114, at 619-28 (2005) (discussing important cases decided by the courts
applying Section 187).
124. See, e.g., Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1373 (11th Cir. 2003)
(overruling an Alabama district court's ruling that venue was proper in Alabama and allowing
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provisions barring or limiting enforcement
of choice-of-law provisions in
25
contracts.1
service
or
employment
These disparate choice-of-law regimes have played an important role in
setting state corporate and employment law on different trajectories for
interjurisdictional competition. Indeed, because the internal affairs norm
emerged very early as a quasi-jurisdictional doctrine and quietly transformed
into a horizontal choice-of-law rule, 126 party autonomy in the selection of
corporate law-and hence, law-as-commodity competition-took hold well
before the loosening of the traditional constraints imposed on party autonomy
in other areas, including employment. The inertia of history and precedent
obviously contributes to the differences that remain today.
Yet the formal distinctions between the choice-of-law rules that prevail in
these areas should not be viewed as either independently decisive or
permanent. 127 States adhere to these different frameworks-for example, the
internal affairs doctrine and Section 187-voluntarily, and apply them
somewhat differently by jurisdiction and situation. For example, contrary to the
claims of the Delaware Supreme Court, the internal affairs doctrine does not
have a constitutional dimension.1 28 Although, on the margins, there may be
Dormant Commerce Clause and Full Faith and Credit limitations, individual
states have broad discretion to decide whether and how to apply these choiceof-law rules to firm activities occurring within the state or otherwise affecting
state interests. 129 A few states, most notably California, already recognize
the court to apply Georgia substantive law to the noncompetition agreement); Palmer & Cay,
Inc. v. Marsh & McClennan Co., No. 4:03-CV-00094-BAE, 2003 WL 24096162, at *10 (S.D.
Ga. Nov. 11, 2003) (determining that noncompetition agreements were unenforceable in
Georgia), aff'd in part, vacated in part 404 F.3d 1297 (11 th Cir. 2005); Convergys Corp. v.
Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 2003) (determining that Georgia courts will not enforce a
choice-of-law clause if doing so would contravene Georgia policy).
125. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2007) (stating that Louisiana will not enforce a
choice-of-law provision in an employment contract unless the employee consents to the clause
after the occurrence of the incident that gave rise to the dispute).
126. See Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 664-65,674-79 (noting the transition of the
internal affairs doctrine); Tung, supra note 38, at 44-46 (arguing that the internal affairs
doctrine became a choice-of-law rule).
127. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1994: A View
"From the Trenches", 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that scholars tend to agree that
choice-of-law frameworks themselves are sufficiently flexible that they do not produce
consistent outcomes across jurisdictions).
128. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 24, at 111, 117-24 (arguing that the Delaware Supreme
Court's constitutional conclusions are a "significant stretch"); Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4,
at 716-21 (arguing there is very little constitutional support for the internal affairs doctrine).
129. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 24, at 115-17 (stating that a state can often use its own
choice-of-law provisions when corporate activity affects it); Ribstein & O'Hara, supranote 4, at
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limitations on the internal affairs doctrine, 130 and the Restatementarticulation of
the doctrine expressly acknowledges that it is not absolute.' 3 ' A state could, for
example, choose to apply a choice-of-law analysis to corporate internal affairs
more akin to Section 187.132 Indeed, as I discuss in another article,' 33 Delaware
is very much aware of the genuine threat such inroads into the internal34affairs
norm pose to the benefits of its domination in the chartering market.'
Horizontal choice of law therefore is essentially a political rather than a
constitutional matter. While the prevailing choice-of-law rules in the corporate
and employment areas are products of distinct histories, they are also subject to
shifts in local policy preferences and are the result of local political judgments
about when and the extent to which other local interests should outweigh party
autonomy.135 Thus, most of the time, states continue to allow party autonomy
to trump local corporate governance interests such as the protection of resident
minority shareholders. At the same time, states have been less willing to allow
party autonomy to trump local interests in protecting resident employees. 36 For
example, it is unlikely that a state would enforce a choice-of-law clause
between an in-state resident employee and an out-of-state employer that would
result in the application of minimum wage or workers' compensation
protections weaker than those under local law. Yet in both the corporate and

718 (stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause "would not compel enforcement of choice-oflaw clauses").
130. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2006) (applying California corporate law to
the affairs of some foreign corporations); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. §§ 1317-1320 (McKinney2003)
(applying New York law concerning directors and officers of foreign corporations doing
business in New York).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
132. Cf Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 716-21 (discussing policy reasons and
constitutional justifications for upholding choice-of-law issues).
133. See generally Glynn, supranote 24.
134. In VantagePoint Venture Partners1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005),
the Delaware Supreme Court responded to this threat by claiming that California and other
states are constitutionally bound to apply Delaware law to Delaware corporations (regardless of
the location of their shareholders or operations). Id. at 1113-18. Although the decision is
doctrinally weak, the court's aim was not so much to persuade as to deter other states from
abandoning the internal affairs norm and to create the appearance of ongoing interjurisdictional
conflict that might convince federal lawmakers to step in and mandate adherence to the internal
affairs norm. Glynn, supra note 24, at 136-43.
135. See supra Parts II.B.I-2 (discussing historical changes in state supply of and
consumer demand for favorable choice-of-law rules).
136. See supra Parts II.B. 1-2 (discussing reasons why states defer more to partyautonomy
in corporate matters than in employment matters such as public policy concerns and different
federal regulation in the two areas).
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employment contexts, a state's willingness to enforce choice-of-law terms
could change with the prevailing political winds.
Importantly, however, a state's ability to pursue a law-as-commodity
business is not necessarily determined solely by foreign states' choice-of-law
preferences. Faced with the prospect of resistance from other states to applying
its law, a state interested in competing has a second, sometimes overlooked,
option for seeking to have its law apply extraterritorially. 37 In addition to
relying on other states voluntarily upholding parties' choice of law, a state
marketing its law can, at least in privately litigated disputes, impose its will on
and, hence, on the other states themselves, through its
parties elsewhere,
138
judgments.
As mentioned above and detailed by Professors Eisenberg and Miller,
New York courts give almost absolute respect to choice-of-law clauses in
commercial contracts, at least between sophisticated parties. 139 Similarly, New
York courts are very receptive to choice-of-forum clauses.'40 And, to provide
greater assurance to parties selecting New York law or fora in major
commercial transactions, the state's legislature enacted statutes mandating
4'
enforcement even when the parties have no other connections to the state.'
These guarantees not only bolster the incentives for some parties to choose
New York law and fora and produce work for New York practitioners 142 but
also deny other states the opportunity to apply their own, potentially adverse
choice-of-law rules to contracts selecting its law. Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 143 a state generally must accord a foreign state's judgment the
same preclusive effect that it would give a judgment issued by the foreign

137. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 7-8 (noting that courts must recognize
judgments of other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
138. As a general matter, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to honor the
judgments of other states. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
139. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 33-34.
140. See id. at 36 (stating that New York courts enforce forum-selection clauses unless
there is a strong showing "that they result from fraud or overreaching, are unreasonable or
unfair, or contravene some strong public policy").
141. Id. at 38-39.
142. See id. at 37-38 (stating reasons why "New York's receptive attitude towards choiceof-law and forum selection clauses" is advantageous to contracting parties and New York
practitioners).
143. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.").
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state.44 If a court enters a judgment on a particular matter, foreign jurisdictions
usually will be incapable of reaching a contrary conclusion in pending or later
enforcement proceedings. 45 Thus, facing reluctance by other states to enforce
a choice-of-law clause, a state marketing its law may be able to ensure
enforcement by adjudicating the matter first.
Of course, the state's success using this method depends on a number of
factors, some of which are out of its immediate control. For example, suit must
actually be filed within the state-litigation elsewhere is of no use. 146 Also, to
the extent there is competing litigation in another interested jurisdiction where
enforcement of the clause is unlikely, the judge handling the matter must refuse
to stay or slow proceedings in deference to the other action and reject other
forum-related motions--e.g., a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens or,
where appropriate, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.' 47 Further, the judge
must win the race to final judgment. Accordingly, success of this strategy
depends on buy-in by the judiciary, who may be more removed from political
and interest group influences, feel bound by judicial norms, such as following
precedent, ignoring political considerations, and adhering to notions of comity,
48
or otherwise resist acting to further the state's competitive ambitions. 1
While it is unclear how far New York courts might go in such
interjurisdictional disputes, at least systematically, Delaware's courts have
149
sought to defend the state's corporate law franchise in precisely this manner.
The Delaware Court of Chancery has a history of closely guarding its
jurisdiction in corporate law related matters by, for example, showing a
reluctance to defer to first-filed proceedings elsewhere in the past. 15 0 And, in
144. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 7 n.22 ("For judgments of courts in other
states, recognition is required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
145. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (giving "Acts, records and judicial proceedings...
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States... as they have by law or
usage in the courts of any State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken"); Baker v.
General Motors Corp, 522 U.S. 222, 246 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing how the
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that courts recognize the preclusive effects ofjudgments in
other states); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (same).
146. See Ribstein, supranote 9, at 419-30 (noting the importance of the parties' ability to
choose a forum that will enforce favorable contractual clauses).
147. See id. at 421-22 (discussing advantages of enforcing choice-of-forum clauses and
noting that a court can enforce such clauses "without analyzing and applying another state's law
or establishing controversial precedent on enforcement of contractual choice-of-law").
148. See id. at 448-49 (discussing the pressures that influence members of the judiciary).
149. Glynn, supra note 24, at 137-38; see also Jill E. Fisch, The PeculiarRole of the
DelawareCourts in the Competitionfor CorporateCharters,68 U. CIN. L. REv. 1061, 1074-81
(2000) (discussing developments in Delaware's decisional law on corporate matters).
150. See, e.g., Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Del. Ch. 2003) (declining to stay
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recent decisions, the Chancery Court has become very aggressive in wresting
shareholder derivative actions away from other jurisdictions.15 1 What is
particularly telling about these decisions is that the interests cited for not
deferring-including the internal affairs doctrine and the presence ofunresolved
questions of Delaware law--can be used to justify Delaware's pushing ahead in
almost any corporate law matter. Moreover, because the Court of Chancery is
designed for speed, 15523 its Chancellors almost always can issue a final judgment
before other courts.'
Consider how this race-to-judgment strategy is a win-win-win for Delaware.
By wresting shareholder litigation involving Delaware corporations away from
other jurisdictions, Delaware ensures that its own law gets applied to such
disputes; it pleases its primary corporate constituents-firm managers-who, on
balance, would prefer to have such matters litigated in Delaware (even if they
occasionally lose there); and it signals to the plaintiffs' bar how its members can
create more work for themselves (and, as a result, their colleagues in the local
defense bar). 15 4 Delaware's coordinated efforts-i.e., buy-in by its courts and
local interest groups-to promote and then win the race to judgment in the
corporate area shows the potential for this approach to benefit a state committed
to law-as-commodity competition when enforcement of its law is uncertain
elsewhere.

the current case in deference to an action first filed elsewhere); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., C.A. No. 15452, 1997 WL 118402, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 1997) (same); see also
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng'g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del.
1970) (setting forth the factors to consider in determining whether to stay an action that was
filed first in another jurisdiction).
151. See, e.g., Brandin v. Deason, 941 A.2d 1020,1021 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion
to stay the Delaware proceeding in favor of a later-filed parallel Texas action); In re Topps Co.
Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d 951,953-54 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying a motion to stay or dismiss
the current Delaware action in favor of a first-filed parallel action in New York); Ryan v.
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 346 (Del. Ch. 2007) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss or stay in
favor of an earlier-filed California action). In another context, the Delaware Supreme Court
recently emphasized that Delaware courts should resist giving up jurisdiction over corporate
disputes. See Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 2006) (reversing a
forum non conveniens dismissal, because, while Florida would be convenient and Florida law
would govern, a Delaware trial was not an overwhelming burden).
152. See Fisch, supra note 149, at 1076-77 (stating that Delaware chancery courts resolve
issues quickly because they sit without a jury).
153. See id.at 1085-86 (discussing how "[p]rocedural features of the Delaware courts
enhance their responsiveness").
154. Cf Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 4, at 683-85 (noting that because lawyers generally
are experts in their own law, they can act as local counsel for firms, which creates an incentive
to promote management-friendly legislation).
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We have yet to observe a state engaging in a Delaware-like competition
strategy in the employment law context; although, as the discussion ofAdvanced
Bionics suggests, we do see some interjurisdictional conflicts and aggressive
judicial behavior in the enforcement of NCAs.155 Again, this contrast is due in
part to -the fact that the demand and supply-side incentives to engage in such
competition have, to date, not been as strong15 6 and because the prominence of
federal claims makes forum selection and first-filed rule considerations more
complicated. 5 7 It is also due to differences in plaintiffs and proceedings, which
may limit use of such a strategy in some circumstances.' Again, because most
employment disputes involve alleged violations of employee rights, employees
typically are the first movers in litigation and thus control initial forum
selection. 159 In the absence of some kind of consent, if the employer files a
second suit in the state designated by the choice-of-law clause, that state may lack
personal jurisdiction over an employee who resides and works elsewhere. 60 This
complication is less likely in corporate law litigation, since the second-filed action
may be brought by another set of shareholders seeking to represent the
corporation or by management seeking declaratory relief against the firm itself.
Moreover, even if some in-state constituencies prefer aggressive competitive
tactics, courts may be reluctant to sidestep the first-filed rule and proceed with
second-filed suits brought by employers.' 6' Regardless of their motives,
Delaware's Chancellors often are able to justify their seizure of litigation as best
for the corporation or the shareholders as a whole, particularly when the

155. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing "the rise of interjurisdictional
disputes involving NCA enforcement").
156. See supra Part I (stating that "[o]n the demand side, firm managers typically are less
concerned about horizontal choice-of-law considerations in employment than in the corporate
context," and, "[o]n the supply side, states have fewer incentives to promote firm selection of
their employment law extraterritorially").
157. See supra Part I (noting that differences amongst state employment laws are "usually
insignificant compared to the legal risks from federal employment law").
158. Compare supra Part I (discussing that in the employment context "employees often
control forum selection" and are the plaintiffs in litigation), with supra Part I (discussing how
"employers typically are the first movers in NCA litigation").
159. See supra Part I ("[Blecause employees often control forum selection (absent an
arbitration clause), they are able to avoid the employer-preferred law by filing in a more
hospitable jurisdiction.").
160. A court must have personal jurisdiction over both parties in order to adjudicate a
dispute and a court seeking long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant must establish that a
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-78 (1985) (discussing what minimum contacts are required

between a party and the forum state).
161.

Ribstein, supra note 9, at 448-49.
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underlying claims are derivative in nature. 62 Since such a justification is absent
in the employment context, it may be more difficult for a court to claim that it is
the more appropriate forum: The second suit is likely to be the mirror image of
the first and, thus, an unambiguous exercise in forum shopping. In light of the
uncertainty all of this produces, and for other reasons discussed previously,
arbitration probably is a more attractive option for employers in 63many
circumstances than trying to win the race to judgment in dueling courts.
Nevertheless, the potential for such competition in the employment area
remains. Some of the foregoing impediments to the second-filed proceedingsuch as lack ofpersonal jurisdiction over and undue burden on employees-may
be countered, at least to the satisfaction of courts in states engaged in competition,
with contractual choice-of-forum or consent-to-jurisdiction clauses.' 64 Moreover,
the background choice-of-law and comity principles leave much flexibility in
application. In addition, if differences in the substance or enforcement of
underlying law produce stakes high enough both for employers and for a state
wishing to market its law as a commodity,
both may work to ensure that even
165
initially reluctant local courts go along.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because oftheir in terrorem effects, a
competing state's judgments can defeat another state's public policy prerogatives
as a practical matter, even if the competing state cannot ensure extraterritorial
enforcement in every case. Even a relatively small number ofjudgments favoring
employers in the competing state might send a powerful signal to present and
future employees that the employer can and will enforce its preferred terms. 66
162. See, e.g., In reTopps Co. Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d 951,961-62 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(discussing how Delaware adjudication of matters involving a Delaware corporation is good for
the investors as a whole).
163. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the advantages of using arbitration to minimize
litigation risk and resolve employee disputes quickly and efficiently).
164. See Eisenberg & Miller, supranote 3, at 7-8 (noting that forum selection clauses are
'usually effective to confer jurisdiction on the court selected by the parties").
165. As Eisenberg and Miller detail, interest groups were able to convince the New York
legislature to pass a number of statutory provisions limiting the ability of New York courts to
choose not to enforce choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses contained in large commercial
contracts. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 3, at 33-39.
166. Scholars have discussed this kind of effect in the NCA area. Whether or not NCAs
ultimately are fully enforceable, their presence and potential enforcement can affect employee
behavior on a wide scale. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supranote 28, at 980-84 (discussing this
effect and the literature); Catharine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New PsychologicalContractand
the Ownership of Human Capital,34 CoNN. L. REv. 765, 782-83 (2002) (discussing the in
terrorem value of NCAs even in jurisdictions where they are unenforceable); Charles A.
Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment
Restraintsof Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 621,622-23 (discussing how the presence and potential
enforcement of NCAs affect employees' behavior).
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Not only might this result in employees being resigned to such terms, but the
added costs and risks of having to prevail in dueling litigation might also deter
employees from seeking relief downstream. Thus, ultimate enforcement may be
less important than a supplier state's willingness to race to judgment on behalf of
employers who have selected its law.
III. Noncompetition Agreements and Law-as-Commodity Interjurisdictional
Competition: A Case-Study
As the prior Part demonstrates, conditions generally have not been ripe for
law-as-commodity competition in the employment law area. 167 Yet, importantly,
none of these conditions are necessarily permanent. The emergence of different
firm- and state-level incentives therefore could lead to corporate law-like
interjurisdictional competition or a more limited variant in the employment
context. In exploring this possibility, consider, for example, noncompetition
agreements.
A. NCA Enforcement: Demandand Supply-Side Incentives
In the NCA context, the demand-side equation can differ sharply from most
other areas of employment law. Where technological innovation or sustained
customer relationships drive firm value, the risks to employers of competition
from former employees may exceed other legal risks.168 Recently, this has
produced the dramatic growth in the use of such covenants, particularly in the
170
69
information and technology sectors, and litigation over their enforcement.
167. See generally supra Part II.
168. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
602-03 (1999) (discussing employers' interest in preventing "employee-disseminated spillovers
of employee proprietary knowledge" by enforcing NCAs).
169. Cf Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy:
BalancingInnovationfrom Employee Mobility Against Legal Protectionfor Human Capital
Investment, 27 BERK. J. EMp. & LAB. L. 287, 295-97 (2006) (discussing these changes and the
importance of NCAs); Estlund, Between Rights and Contract, supra note 28, at 392 ("The
growth of the information-based economy has converged with increasing job mobility to
generate an upsurge in [NCAs], as well as in scholarly attention to those covenants."); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 723 (2002) (discussing the growth in the use of
and litigation over NCAs).
170. See Stone, Shadow of Globalization,supra note 2, at 17 (discussing how economic
changes, the rise in importance of human capital to firms, and employee incentives have resulted

INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION

1419

Moreover, horizontal choice-of-law considerations with regard to NCAs
are paramount because enforcement varies widely from state to state.
California and a few other states broadly prohibit NCAs as unlawful restraints
on trade.' 71 Other states, such as Georgia, subject such agreements to rigorous
scrutiny. 172 Most other states will enforce these agreements, although not if
their only purpose is to limit former employee competition.' 73 These states
typically require NCAs to serve some other "legitimate interest" of the
employer-such as protecting trade secrets or goodwill 17 4-and enforce them
only to the extent their restrictions are "reasonable" in scope (i.e., time,
substance, and sometimes geography). 175 Courts occasionally
also require that
76
an NCA be supported by separate consideration.1
in the enforceability of post-termination restraints being "probably the most fiequently litigated
issue in the employment area").
17 1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2007) (stating that contracts restricting
professions and trades are generally void unless excepted); HAW. REv. STAT. § 480-84 (2007)
(same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2007) (same); see also COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2007)
(prohibiting covenants that restrict employment with specific exceptions).
172. See Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. RoadTrac, LLC, 551 S.E.2d 735,737 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (stating that restrictive covenants in employment contracts are strictly scrutinized
under Georgia law and nonseverable).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981) (noting that an NCA
in the employment context must be ancillary to a "transaction or relationship that gives rise to an
interest worthy of protection" and that an NCA without such a connection is "necessarily
unreasonable").
174. See Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargainingfor Loyalty in the InformationAge: A
Reconsiderationofthe Role ofSubstantive Fairnessin Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80
OR. L. REv. 1163, 1176-77 (2001) ("Those interests that satisfy this test and constitute
'protectable' employer interests fall into two doctrinal categories: interests in customer
relationships or business goodwill and interests in confidential or secret business information.");
Estlund, Between Rights and Contract, supra note 28, at 393-94 (discussing legitimate
protectable interests covered by NCAs).
175. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 174, at 1178 (stating that the "reasonable
inquiry" focuses on the duration of time, geographic area, and substance covered by the NCA);
Estlund, Between Rights andContract,supra note 28, at 381 (noting that NCAs are "scrutinized
for the legitimacy of the employer interests that they protect and the reasonableness of the
restraints they place on postemployment competition"); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants,
Employee Training,and the Limits of Transaction-CostAnalysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 54-58 (2001)
(discussing the legitimate interest and reasonableness factors).
176. See Alex SheshunoffMgmt. Serv., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644,651 (Tex. 2006)
("The covenant cannot be a stand-alone promise from the employee lacking any new
consideration from the employer."); see also Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d
207, 209 (S.C. 2001) (discussing whether an NCA was supported by sufficient consideration
from the employer); cf. Arnow-Richman, supra note 174, at 1239-40 (stating that courts
typically find that employment itself is adequate consideration, but some courts will require
additional compensation or some other consideration for NCAs signed long after employment
commenced).
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Yet, even in those states that have adopted the legitimate interest and
reasonableness approach, application may differ. For instance, some states
rarely find NCAs enforceable. 177 Others tend to enforce NCAs to the extent
they find them reasonably necessary to protect one or more of a broad range of
interests.17 8 Further, while some states will not reform overly broad NCA
terms, many are willing to rewrite or "blue pencil" provisions to enforce them
to the extent they are reasonable. 79 Thus, in practice, state treatment lies along
80
a wide spectrum from near-certain nonenforcement to frequent enforcement.
These differences in NCA enforcement regimes may have important
market-wide effects, not just for workers but for business activity more
generally. For example, Professor Ronald Gilson has argued that California's
triumph over Massachusetts in technological innovation is partially due to the
greater transfer of knowledge
among firms due to California's prohibition of
8
post-employment NCAs.1 1
177.

See, e.g., Estlund, Between Rights and Contract,supra note 28, at 395 (discussing

how Texas's "strict scrutiny" approach presumes that NCAs are invalid and requires
"'compelling' employer interests and a tighter fit between those interests and the covenant's
restrictions").
178. See, e.g., id. at 395 (discussing Massachusetts's recognition of abroad range ofNCAsupporting interests and its tendency to enforce reasonably necessary provisions); cf ArnowRichman, supranote 174, at 1181-97 (detailing how courts have found enforceable legitimate
interests by broadening traditional categories-such as trade secrets and highly specialized
training-to cover more amorphous interests).
179. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 4454.774a (2007) (stating a court may limit an NCA
to render it reasonable and enforce it as limited), Fearnow v. Ridenour, Swenson, Cleere &
Evans, P.C., 138 P.3d 723, 731 (Ariz. 2006) (noting that Arizona courts may edit but not
rewrite NCAs), and Intermountain Eye & Laser Ctrs. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 130-31 (Idaho
2005) (stating that a court may "simply and accurately" edit NCAs), with Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 103.465 (2006) (stating that unreasonable NCAs are void in their entirety). See also ArnowRichman, supra note 28, at 965 n.6, 976 n.49, 989 n.99 (discussing judicial approaches to NCA
reformation).
180. See Estlund, Between Rights and Contract,supra note 28, at 421 (noting variances
among state's treatment of NCAs).
181. See Gilson, supra note 168, at 602-09; see also Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or
Give Me Death-The Role of Competition and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley 3-4
(Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 99, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/villanovalwps/papers/art99 (discussing California and Massachusetts
approaches to enforcing NCAs). See generally Alan Hyde, The Wealth ofSharedInformation:
Silicon Valley's High- Velocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of
Trade Secrets (Sept. 1998) (unpublished paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), availableat http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/-hyde/ (follow "Silicon Valley: The Wealth
of Shared Information; Some Economics of Nonrivalrous Information"; "Legal Impediments to
Endogenous Growth"; "How Silicon Valley Effectively Abolished Trade Secrets"; and "Three
Alternative Economic Analyses" hyperlinks) (discussing the legal and economic factors,
including the lack of impediments to employee mobility, that contributed to the growth of
Silicon Valley's computer industry).
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From the perspective of an employer seeking to manage risk, which state's
noncompetition law governs the enforcement of NCAs also matters-a lot.
Individual employers have a strong incentive to keep their employees and
intellectual capital from migrating to competitors.' 82 Indeed, at least with
regard to some types of firms or categories of workers, employers' ex ante
concerns regarding NCA enforceability against departing
employees may
83
outweigh all other employment law considerations.1
These substantive distinctions and corresponding incentives also alter
employers' forum considerations. Where the threat of employee competition is
paramount, arbitration clauses are of less value to employers and may, in fact,
be detrimental, because effective enforcement often requires immediate
injunctive relief to prevent the competitive activity. Although an arbitrator may
be empowered to award injunction relief, arbitration is typically not conducive
to facilitating speedy resolution or providing interim remedies. 84 Moreover,
employers often want to join the former employee's putative new employer as a
defendant-a tactic binding arbitration would preclude.' 85 Thus, perhaps
ironically, while both arbitration and NCAs have risen to recent prominence in
employment law practice, 86 they do not work well together.
182. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 174, at 1202-03 (discussing employers' "People
Interest" in the availability of skilled employees); Estlund, Between Rights and Contract,supra
note 28, at 415-17 (discussing employers' reasons for using NCAs to protect trade secrets and
other business interests); Gilson, supra note 168, at 609 (noting that a firm has an individual
interest in restricting the mobility of its employees). Professor Gilson suggests the presence of a
collective action problem: While the market as a whole may benefit from nonenforcement,
individual employers have powerful incentives to have their employees sign NCAs. Id. at 609.
The prospect of NCA enforcement might produce other related benefits for employers, including
keeping down compensation levels by making exit more difficult and reducing the need to
compensate employees to prevent them from leaving.
183. See Gilson, supra note 168, at 609 (discussing the importance of NCAs as a method
of protecting employer knowledge).
184. Cf. Hough Assocs. v. Hill, No. Civ. A. 2385-N, 2007 WL 148751, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
17, 2007) (noting that NCAs often give rise to expedited suits for injunctive relief against not
only the employees but also third parties, and this might motivate an employer to favor a
judicial forum over arbitration).
185. Arbitration would preclude joining the putative new employer as a defendant because
the new employer is not a party to the arbitration agreement. See id at * 13 (noting that in the
NCA context a former employer will often "seek injunctive relief against the competing
employee's new employer, a party that will, for obvious reasons, not have signed up to arbitrate
that dispute").
186. See Estlund, Between Rights and Contract,supra note 28, at 379 (discussing how
NCAs and mandatory arbitration agreements are important and controversial contractual
instruments in employment law); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The
Rise of Delayed Term, StandardForm Employment Agreements, 49 ARiz. L. REV. 637, 638
(2007) (noting employers' increasing use of both these types of contract terms).
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Some courts have been willing to grant preliminary injunctions barring
competition pending the outcome of arbitration, 8 7 but others are unwilling to
entertain such motions when a binding arbitration clause is present. 88 On
balance, the safer route for an employer with great ex ante concerns about
preventing employee competition is to omit arbitration clauses from
employment contracts containing noncompetition provisions. Either way,
access to a hospitable judicial rather than arbitral forum is essential--something
that distinguishes NCA enforcement from most other types of employment
litigation.
Noncompetition litigation differs from most other employment-related
suits in another important respect. Employers typically are the first movers 8in9
NCA litigation-they sue, alleging breach of contract and related claims.
Firms therefore have a much greater ability in this context than in other areas of
employment law to control the judicial forum in the first instance.
As a whole, employers facing a substantial risk of employee competition
have powerful incentives to choose the applicable law and find a hospitable
judicial, rather than arbitral, forum when anticipating the need to enforce
noncompetition agreements. The recent growth in litigation over employment
contracts containing both noncompetition clauses and choice-of-law or forumselection clauses provides some evidence of this. Advanced Bionics'90 is the
best-known example; Keener v. Convergys Corp.191 and Application Group,
Inc. v. HunterGroup, Inc.192 also have received significant attention, and there
are many others. 193 And, while arbitration clauses have received the most
187. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith v. Schwartz, 991 F. Supp. 1480,
1482 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (granting preliminary injunction upholding an NCA). Another option is
to exclude claims for injunctive relief from arbitration. See, e.g., James & Jackson, L.L.C. v.
Willie Gary, L.L.C., 906 A.2d 76, 81 (Del. 2006) (describing an arbitration clause which allows
nonbreaching parties to obtain injunctive relief in court). The downside of such an exclusion
for employers is that employees seeking both monetary and equitable remedies for alleged
violations of federal or state law may also gain access to a judicial forum in the first instance.
188. See, e.g., Bakery Drivers & Salesmen Local 194 v. Harrison Baking Group, 869 F.
Supp. 1168, 1178-80 (D.N.J. 1994) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion
to compel expedited arbitration where parties consented to an arbitration agreement).
189. See supra Part I (noting that "employers typically are the first movers in NCA
litigation").
190. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text (discussing Advanced Bionics).
191. See Keener v. Convergys Corp., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (finding
the NCA between the parties unenforceable), aff'd in part,rev'd in part 342 F.3d 1264 (11 th
Cir. 2003).
192. See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 75 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (affirming the trial court's decision to apply California law in determining that the
NCA was unenforceable).
193. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 9, at 376 (discussing statistics on cases involving
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judicial and scholarly attention of all employer risk-management techniques,
choice-of-law and choice-of-judicial-forum
clauses emerge more frequently in
94
the noncompetition context.'
Turning to the supply side, conditions likewise may be favorable to
competition. As an initial matter, the balance of interests at issue in the
enforcement of NCAs may play differently in many jurisdictions than do other
employment law doctrines. For example, although some employers now insist
that a much broader group of employees sign noncompetition agreements, the
class of employees against whom such clauses have been enforced historically
have greater bargaining power and, hence, may have garnered less sympathy
than other employees. 195 The willingness of many states to enforce NCAs
within certain limits may also suggest the intuitive appeal of employer claims
that their businesses are vulnerable to opportunistic former employees.196
Furthermore, enforcing NCAs broadly may be politically appealing in
states where employers fear their employees being wooed away by out-of-state
competitors; in other words, legal decision makers may be convinced to enforce
robustly restrictive covenants if, on balance, they perceive the need to protect
local firms from external competition. This is something scholars have
suggested in their discussion of Massachusetts's employer-friendly NCA
regime and its competition with California's high-tech sector. 197 The threat of
competition from California to Minnesota's significant medical device segment
also may have influenced the Minnesota court in the Advanced Bionics
litigation. 98 In fact, some courts will declare explicitly that the state has an
interest in protecting local firms from such foreign competition. 99
choice-of-law provisions and noncompetition clauses in employment agreements).
194. See, e.g., Eisenberg& Miller, supra note 3, at 8-10 (discussing the historical context
for increased use of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions in contracts).
195.

Cf Estlund, Between Rights and Contract,supra note 28, at 392 (stating that NCAs

have filtered down to lower-level employees with relatively little sophistication, bargaining
power, or economic wherewithal).
196. Cf id.at 379 (describing a former employee's right to compete as "conditionally
waivable").
197. See, e.g., Gilson, supranote 168, at 602-13 (comparing Massachusetts and California
laws with respect to NCAs and their impact on the states' competition within the high-tech

sector).
198. See Michael D. Goodman, The Medical Device Industry in Massachusetts: An
Updated Profile, A Presentation to MassMEDIC's 11th Annual Meeting (May 1, 2007),
http://www.massmedic.com/docs/goodman07.pdf(indicating that Minnesota is ranked second to
California in the absolute number of employees and annual payroll in the medical device
industry and ranks first on a per capita basis).
199. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
("Just as California has a strong interest in protecting those employed in California, so too does
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States where the internal dynamics have produced such employer-friendly
noncompetition regimes therefore have powerful incentives to please home
firms by offering to enforce their law extraterritorially. Given the importance
of these matters to employers and the sheer volume of litigated noncompetition
cases, 200 they may also have good reasons to enter the broader market to attract
additional NCA business. Thus, some states may have incentives to sell their
NCA regime akin to the incentives New York has to sell its commercial law.
B. Evidence of Emerging Competition?
1. Law-as-Commodity Competition by TransactionallyConnectedStates
In light of the foregoing conditions, is there evidence that law-ascommodity variants of interjurisdictional competition exist in the NCA
context? As discussed above, choice-of-law clauses and choice-of-forum
clauses have proliferated in employment contracts containing NCAs. And, the
validity of these clauses are now the subject of frequent litigation.2 0 1 This most
often occurs when an employee leaves to work for a new employer in another
state. The circumstances in Advanced Bionics provide the classic example: An
employee who had signed an NCA containing a choice-of-law clause while
working for a Minnesota-based firm left the state to work for a California
employer. 0 2
Of course, as discussed above in Part II.B.3, choice-of-law doctrine and
the constraints on party autonomy limit the use of choice-of-law clauses. In
determining whether to adhere to a choice-of-law clause in the NCA context,
states tend to apply Section 187 or other choice-of-law frameworks containing
public policy limitations rather than a corporate-internal-affairs-type doctrine.2 °3
New York have a strong interest in protecting companies doing business [in New York].").
200. See Stone, Shadow of Globalization,supra note 2, at 17 ("The enforceability of posttermination restraints is now probably the most frequently litigated issue in the employment
area.").
201. See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 376 (discussing an analysis of trends in the enforcement
of NCAs and choice-of-law clauses among states); Symeonides, supranote 10, at 26 (discussing
how incentives for a "race to the courthouse" arise when the current and former employers are
citizens of different states and both want their local law to apply in determining the
enforceability of the NCA).
202. See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 233-35 (Cal. 2002)
(discussing the facts of the case); see also supra Part I (discussing Advanced Bionics as an
example of "interjurisdictional disputes involving NCA enforcement").
203. See, e.g., Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 2003) (refusing to
uphold an NCA agreement which contravened the public policy of the forum state); Symeon C.
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Those jurisdictions most protective of employees--e.g., those that prohibit or
rarely enforce NCAs-are likely to invalidate choice-of-law clauses designating
more permissive law. 204 This conclusion typically is based on one or more of
the following findings: (i) enforcement would violate a fundamental public
policy of the state;20 5 (ii) the forum state has a greater interest in applying its
law than the state whose law is chosen; 2z 6 or (iii) the state whose law was
chosen 2has
an insufficient relationship to the contract to support application of
07
its law.
In some jurisdictions, a finding that the covenant violates a fundamental
state public policy is enough to invalidate a choice-of-law clause.20 8 Section
187 requires the second finding as well, but courts in jurisdictions that adhere
to this approach and view NCAs as unenforceable often find both and
invalidate the selection of another state's law, 209 even if an employee signed a
Symeonides, The JudicialAcceptance of the Second ConflictsRestatement: A Mixed Blessing,
56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1266 (1997) (discussing state approaches to following the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws' approach in tort and contract disputes).
204. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2007) (voiding all choice-of-law clauses in
employment contracts unless employee voluntarily ratifies the choice after the occurrence of the
cause of action); DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)
(affirming the district court's invalidation of the Ohio choice-of-law clause and applying
Nebraska law to the NCA); Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1133 (11 th Cir. 2005)
(affirming the district court's invalidation of the Alabama choice-of-law clause and applying
Georgia law to the NCA); Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1367 (11 th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the district court's invalidation of the Alabama choice-of-law clause and applying
Georgia law to the NCA); Keener v. Convergys Corp., 342 F.3d 1264, 1265 (11 th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the district court's invalidation of the Ohio choice-of-law clause and applying
Georgia law to the NCA); Pruco Sec. Corp. v. Montgomery, 264 F. Supp. 2d 862, 868 (D.N.D.
2003) (invalidating the parties' choice of New Jersey law and applying North Dakota law).
205. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 714, 728-29 (D.S.C. 2007) (disregarding a
choice-of-law clause where application of the chosen law would violate the public policy of the
forum state); Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 2003) (same); Beilfuss v.
Huffy Corp., 685 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (same).
206. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2006)
(considering whether the forum state has a greater interest than the chosen state in the case as a
factor in determining whether to respect a choice-of-law clause).
207. See id. (finding Ohio lacked a substantial relationship to the parties or transaction);
Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding incorporation in
Delaware to be an insufficient connection between the contract and Delaware and applying
Illinois law).
208. Georgia is one such jurisdiction. See Convergys Corp., 582 S.E.2d at 85
(disregarding a choice-of-law clause where application of the chosen law would violate the
public policy of the forum state).
209. See DCS SanitationMgmt., 435 F.3d at 896-97 (considering whether both sections of
the Restatement are satisfied and deciding to apply Nebraska law rather than the chosen laws);
see also Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814-16 (S.D. Ind. 2007)
(setting out the five factors that Indiana courts should consider in evaluating an NCA as:
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covenant while working for the employer in the other state and only later
moved to the forum to work.2 10 In the latter circumstance, the courts reason
that the forum state has a greater interest in regulating because the
noncompetition clause addresses post-employment conduct, which takes place
within the forum rather than in the state of former employment. 211 The third
basis also is contemplated in Section 187, which requires that the chosen state
have sufficient connection with the employment relationship to have an interest
in regulating or that there is some other reasonable basis for the selection.
Yet, again, this is only half of the choice-of-law story. State suppliers of
more employer-friendly noncompetition law are poised to apply their law
extraterritorially, and aggressively so. First, courts in these states usually find
that their own law applies when there is a significant conflict between the
noncompetition law of the two relevant jurisdictions.1 3 In particular, in cases
(i) subject matter of covenant; (ii) public policy underlying any relevant statute; (iii) whether
nonenforcement of the NCA will further such public policy; (iv) potential damage from
nonenforcement; and (v) relative bargaining power of the parties); Konecranes, Inc. v. Sinclair,
340 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1129-30 (D. Or. 2004) (applying Oregon law in spite of a choice-of-law
clause specifying Ohio and finding the NCA unenforceable as an excessive restraint on trade).
210. See Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998) (applying California choice-of-law rules to an NCA between a California resident
and a Maryland corporation); Symeonides, supra note 10, at 26 (discussing Advanced Bionics
where a California court granted a temporary restraining order against a Minnesota employer
who was seeking to enforce an NCA against a former employee now domiciled in California
(citing Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronics, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001))).
211. See Davis v. Advanced Care Techs., Inc., No. Civ. S-06-2449 RRB DAD, 2007 WL
2288298, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (finding that "California has a 'materially greater
interest' in the outcome... than Connecticut because it has a greater connection with the facts
of this case and the determination of the enforceability of the Non-Competition Agreement will
affect whether Davis, a California resident, will be permitted to remain employed in
California"); Application Group, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85 (finding "California has a correlative
interest in protecting its employers and their employees from anticompetitive conduct by out-of
state employers" even if the California employer was not a party to the covenant not to
compete); cf. Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024-26 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(considering the "place of performance" of the NCA as a factor in determining which state's law
to apply).
212. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the choice-of-law determination under Nebraska law); Curtis 1000, 24 F.3d at 94849 (applying Illinois law to the dispute after finding incorporation in Delaware to be an
insufficient connection between the contract and Delaware); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (setting out how to determine which state's law to apply); see
also Kantor, supra note 123, at 726 (discussing that the application of Section 187(2) requires
that the chosen jurisdiction have some relationship with the parties or the contract or some other
"reasonable basis to support the choice"); Symeonides, 2005 Survey, supranote 114, at 619-28
(discussing state approaches to applying Restatement Section 187).
213. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 172-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
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involving a choice-of-law clause pointing to domestic law, these courts tend to
enforce the clause, finding either that the other jurisdiction has no greater
interest in applying its noncompetition law (even if the former employee is
currently employed there) or that their own local public policy-protecting
employer interests-is as strong as the policy of the other state.2t 4 Thus,
perhaps unsurprisingly, states likely to enforce NCAs tend to reach the opposite
conclusion of states unlikely to enforce these terms, even though they may
apply a similar choice-of-law framework. 5
In addition, some courts in supplier jurisdictions have proven aggressive
in enforcing their law. This includes refusing to stay second-filed proceedings
in lieu of first-filed litigation elsewhere and issuing anti-suit injunctions to bar
(enforcing an NCA under New York law based on public policy, notwithstanding conflict
between New York and California law regarding enforcement of NCAs); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (enforcing an NCA
under Minnesota law based on public policy, notwithstanding conflict between Minnesota and
California law regarding enforcement of NCAs); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMI'. L. 1, 59 (2003)
[hereinafter Symeonides, 2002 Annual Survey] (noting that Application Group exemplifies how
California courts would resolve a jurisdictional conflict in NCA policy where there is no
pending litigation in the other state but the Medtronic cases illustrate that "courts of the first
employment state would resolve the same conflict in exactly the opposite way"); Symeonides,
supra note 10, at 26-29 (discussing Medtronic cases); Woodward, supra note 120, at 29-33
(analyzing the fundamental policy restriction with regards to enforcement of NCAs).
214. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73 (concluding that New York law,
not California law, applied because of New York's strong interest in protecting companies
doing business in the state and because it was consistent with the state's recognized interest in
remaining the preeminent commercial nerve center, even though the former employee had
significant ties to California); Machado-Miller v. Mersereau & Shannon, LLP, 43 P.3d 1207,
1212-13 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing California's fundamental policy disfavoring trade
restraints but concluding that this interest is not materially greater than Oregon's interests in
protecting Oregon citizens' ability to choose their employment terms, in creating a disincentive
for leaving one employer for a higher bidder, and in protecting employers from losing trained
employees); see also O'Hara, supra note 39, at 1566-67 (discussing state enforcement of
choice-of-law clauses and noting that "enforcement of these clauses often turns on an expost
race to judgment").
215. See supra note 213 (discussing decisions upholding NCAs based on public policy in
jurisdictions looking to enforce NCAs); O'Hara, supra note 39, at 1566-67 (describing the
variation in state policies regarding enforcement ofNCAs). Compare DCS Sanitation Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 895-98 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that Nebraska law governed an
NCA, notwithstanding an Ohio choice-of-law clause, and concluding that the NCA was overly
broad and unenforceable pursuant to Nebraska law), and Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter
Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 82-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that California law
governed an NCA, notwithstanding a Maryland choice-of-law clause, and concluding that the
NCA was unenforceable as it violated a California statute and the Unfair Practices Act, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17,200-17,210 (West 2008)), with Estee Lauder, 430 F. Supp. 2d at
172-74 (enforcing an NCA under New York Law based on public policy, notwithstanding
conflict between New York and California law regarding the enforcement of NCAs).
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parties from litigating the matter elsewhere.216 The Minnesota court engaged in
such behavior in AdvancedBionics: The employee and his new employer filed
first in California seeking a declaration that the employee could compete; the
former employer responded by filing in Minnesota.2 17 The Minnesota court not
only refused to stay its proceedings, but also sought to bar the former employee
from continuing to litigate in the first matter.2 18
In sum, we observe employers using choice-of-law clauses to take
advantage of more favorable noncompetition law, and the states supplying that
law enforcing it robustly. Activity on both the demand and supply sides is
therefore consistent with the emergence of export-style competition. Whether
the supplier states consciously compete to drum up "enforcement business"
beyond simply protecting domestic employers is unclear. But, at a minimum,
some states are pushing their noncompetition law (regulating the activity of
former employees and their potential new employers in other jurisdictions) for
competitive advantage.
2. Competitionfor NCAs Without Significant TransactionalConnections
To this point, we do not observe the emergence of pure law-as-commodity
competition-that is, party selection of state law favorable to the enforcement
of NCAs but unconnected or minimally connected to the employment
relationship. Here, again, prevailing choice-of-law doctrine imposes an initial
impediment: Under Section 187 (and other analyses2 1l), the designated state
must have a sufficient connection, defined as a "substantial relationship," with
the parties or transaction itself or there must exist some other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice. 220 As a result, most states refuse to enforce a choice-oflaw clause specifying the law of a state other than one having a significant
connection with the employment relationship.2 2'
216. See, e.g., Estee Lauder, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 158, 160 (issuing a preliminary
injunction); Cent. States Indus. Supply, Inc. v. McCullough, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1094 (N.D.
Iowa 2002) (refusing to stay proceedings); Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630
N.W.2d 438, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the Minnesota District Court's injunction
order).
217. Advanced Bionics, 630 N.W.2d at 438.

218. Id.; see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing the Advanced Bionics
court's grant of preliminary injunction).
219. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing choice-of-law analyses in
jurisdictions not adopting Section 187).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
221. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (presenting cases refusing to enforce
choice of law for want of a substantial relationship with the employment contract).
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Yet, choice-of-law principles may develop toward favoring the designation
of the law of a transactionally unrelated state. That has been the law's
trajectory elsewhere, even outside of the corporate chartering context. Again,
New York and Delaware promote their law for various types of commercial
contracts without other substantial connections with the transaction.2 22 Also,
Article 1-301 of the U.C.C. now provides that choice-of-law clauses are
effective "whether or not the transaction bears a relation to the State or country
designated. 2 23 Although this provision expressly excludes customer
contracts,224 and although continuing resistance to such an approach can be
anticipated for employment contracts where employees lack bargaining power,
some states may prove more willing to extend this freedom to employment
contracts, where less profound bargaining inequities exist. And, by
contemplating some other reasonable basis for the parties' choice besides a
substantial relationship with the parties or transaction, Section 187(2)(a) leaves
open this possibility as well.225
Moreover, in the employment context, some courts have been willing to
enforce choice-of-law clauses selecting the place of an employer's principal
operations or headquarters, even though the employee exclusively worked
elsewhere.22 6 In addition, although some courts have found an employer's state
of incorporation alone insufficient to support the choice of its law,227 others,
including the Fourth Circuit, have found otherwise.228

222. See supra Part II.A (comparing interjurisdictional competition models).
223. U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2004).
224. See U.C.C. § 1-301(e) (2004) ("If one of the parties to a transaction is a consumer ....
[a]n agreement [that the law of a state or country shall determine any or all of the parties' rights
and obligations] is not effective unless the transaction bears a reasonable relation to the state or
country designated.").

225.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

187(2)(a) (1971).

226. See, e.g., Estee Lauder Cos., Inc. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(selecting the law of New York, the location of Estee Lauder's headquarters, despite Batra
spending his entire tenure with Estee Lauder in California); Guidant Sales Corp. v. Niebur, No.
01-1772, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17797, at * 17 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2001) (applying Minnesota
law despite the employee's having worked exclusively in Illinois).
227. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding an
insufficient connection between an employment contract and Delaware, the employer's state of
incorporation, to justify an Illinois court's invalidation of a consensual choice-of-law clause).
228. See, e.g., Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312,324 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a
party's state of incorporation provides the necessary substantial relationship for application of
that state's law); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 807-08 (D. Minn. 1989) (stating
that a party's incorporation in a state is a contact sufficient to allow the parties to choose that
state's law to govern their contract).
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Still, states prohibiting or greatly restricting NCAs typically refuse to
enforce choice-of-law clauses even when the chosen state has a substantial
relationship to the parties. 229 Thus, it seems unlikely that they would prove
willing to credit a choice-of-law clause designating a state with a more
attenuated connection to the parties. In other words, broad acceptance of an
internal affairs-type choice-of-law regime appears doubtful in this context.
Nevertheless, even widespread resistance to such choice-of-law terms may
not eliminate law-as-commodity competition. Again, if a state's legal decision
makers-in particular, its judiciary-refuse to defer to other jurisdictions and
structure their processes to win the race to judgment, the state can force
extraterritorial acceptance of its terms. 230 Thus, if a state that generally enforces
NCAs wants enforcement business, it may do so through aggressive tactics
despite resistance from other states.
Consider, then, the type of state that might choose such a strategy. To
attract firm management and to produce no significant opposition within the
state, the state's law would have to be among the most permissive with regard
to enforcing NCAs. Moreover, the state must have a judicial branch not only
receptive to furthering its competitive designs, but also capable of bringing
disputes over NCAs to judgment quickly.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Delaware fits this description, and other states
may as well. Like a number of its East Coast neighbors, 231' Delaware has shown
a willingness to enforce NCAs robustly, provided they serve some legitimate
employer interest. 232 It is also hospitable to former employer claims against
233

new employers for tortious interference with NCA terms.

229. See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement of choice-oflaw clauses).
230. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the race-to-judgment strategy).
231. See Hyde, supra note 181 (follow "Legal Impediments to Endogenous Growth"
hyperlink) (discussing NCA enforcement in Massachusetts, New York, and elsewhere).
232. See Del. Express Shuttle, Inc. v. Older, No. 19596,2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *40
(Oct. 23, 2002) ("[C]ovenants restricting future employment must be determined to be
reasonably limited with respect to both geography and time; they must as well advance a
legitimate economic interest of the employer."); see also, e.g., Hough Assocs. v. Hill, No. 2385N, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5, at *48-51 (Jan. 17,2007) (upholding an NCA where it adequately
protected the employer's economic interests); Del. Express Shuttle, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124,
at *40-54 (same); Norton v. Cameron, No. 15212-NC, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32, at *9-16 (Mar.
5, 1998) (same).
233. See, e.g., Hough Assocs., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 5 at *46-62 (finding that the
subsequent employer of an employee bound by an NCA tortiously interfered with the legitimate
interests of the employee's prior employer when the subsequent employer knowingly hired him
and engaged in discussions forbidden by that NCA).
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Delaware is campaigning to attract additional chartering and business
litigation activity. 23 For example, it has recently sought to attract greater
numbers of closely held entities to the state to compensate for stagnating
growth in franchise tax revenues from publicly traded firms.235 It is also
actively seeking to increase U.C.C. filings.236 In addition, in 2003, the
Delaware Legislature expanded the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to cover
certain technology disputes involving at least one Delaware entity and to
mediate a wide range of business disputes, and it extended its ability to obtain
jurisdiction over executives of Delaware firms in suits involving their alleged
wrongful conduct. 237 Robust enforcement ofNCAs, even in the face of dueling
litigation elsewhere, might prove a natural extension of these other recent
initiatives-it could be marketed as yet another "service" Delaware offers its
entity clients.
Moreover, once Delaware recognizes a regulatory interest, its courts
closely guard the state's jurisdiction and extend it broadly to claims against outof-state actors. For example, the Chancery Court recently held that the state has
personal jurisdiction over an attorney residing and practicing in a case
involving alleged breaches of duties while representing a Delaware
corporation. 238 Delaware courts only rarely recognize that matters filed initially
in Delaware should be tried elsewhere, emphasizing that they will do so only in
extreme circumstances. 239 They are far more likely to retain jurisdiction despite
the existence of competing litigation in other states or other states' strong

234. See Glynn, supranote 24, at 125-28 (discussing Delaware's recent efforts to expand
its entity chartering franchise).
235. Id. at 127-28.
236. See DEL. DEP'T OF STATE, Div. OF CORPS., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2006),
http://corp.delaware.gov/2006%2OAnnual%20Report%20with%20Signature20_2_.pdf
(discussing growth in Delaware U.C.C. filings from 2005 to 2006).
237. See Del. Dep't Of State, Div. Of Corps., General Assembly Approves 2003
Amendments to Corporate Laws, June 30, 2003, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/
2003amends.shtml (last visited Aug. 30, 2008) (outlining the expansions of the Court of
Chancery's jurisdiction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
238. Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1057-65 (Del. Ch. 2007).
239. See, e.g., Aveta, Inc. v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 616 (Del. Ch. 2008) (affirming the
Master's decision to stay the Delaware proceeding under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
in an NCA case where the defendant demonstrated overwhelming hardship in litigating the
matter in Delaware, Delaware law did not govern the dispute, and much of the relevant
testimony would be in Spanish). Before affirming the grant of the stay in A veta, the Chancellor
emphasized that "Delaware's courts frequently repeat the adage that only in rare cases can a
defendant successfully defeat a plaintiff's choice of forum. It is even rarer that a defendant can
defeat a plaintiff's choice of forum that is mandated by a contractual forum selection clause."
Id. at 605.
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interests in resolving the underlying dispute. 24 0 Delaware courts also broadly
enforce choice-of-forum clauses, provided such clauses are sufficiently
explicit.241 Furthermore, the Delaware courts' recent, aggressive strategies
for protecting the state's interest in corporate matters evinces both the
willingness and capability of its judicial actors to defend the state's interests
by racing to judgment. 242 Finally, because so many out-of-state firms are
incorporated or chartered within Delaware, it has at least a legal "hook" on
which it can justify exercising jurisdiction and enforcing choice-of-law and
forum clauses in contracts pointing to Delaware.243
The point is not that Delaware consciously engages in competition for
NCA business. Rather, it is that the state is well positioned to do so and that
it does not appear much of a stretch to imagine it furthering its entity-law
franchise by allowing Delaware-chartered firms to bring NCA enforcement
actions there. And this potential extends beyond Delaware. If serious about
competing, other states without Delaware's legal infrastructure, but with
similarly favorable political conditions, could take steps to attract such
business, as New York did in establishing its dominance in the market for
commercial contract enforcement. 2 "
If a state deployed this kind of strategy to compete for NCA enforcement
business there would be complications. For example, diversity jurisdiction
may exist in many noncompetition agreement disputes involving two or more
interested jurisdictions, and, as a result, an employee may file suit in federal
court initially or remove a suit filed by a former employer. This could
directly affect a state's competition strategy because federal judges do not
240. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (describing the Delaware courts'
tendency to closely guard jurisdiction in corporate law matters).
241. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Schoon, No. C.A. 1959-VCL, 2007 WL 949441, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 26,2007) (stating that it is well-settled law in Delaware that the court will give respect
to the parties' agreement regarding forum selection, but, to be interpreted as providing the
exclusive forum, the clause must be clear (citing Prestancia Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Va. Heritage
Found. II, LLC, No. Civ. A. 1032-S, 2005 WL1364616, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 27, 2005))); see
also Aveta, 942 A.2d at 605 (emphasizing how rare it is that a defendant can defeat a plaintiff's
choice of forum that is mandated by a forum-selection clause).
242. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware Court of
Chancery's tendency to closely guard jurisdiction of corporate law matters and its race-tojudgment strategy).
243. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (stating that Delaware captures
approximately 60% of all incorporations of publicly traded firms and over 80% of all nonhome-state incorporations).
244. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing how New York, faced with a
decline in commercial litigation, added a Commercial Division to its Supreme Court, which has
enabled the state to remain competitive in the market for commercial contracts).
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face local political pressure, and, accordingly, may prove less willing to buy
into any such scheme. Moreover, if one or more of the cases occur in federal
court, it alters the legal and practical dynamics of dueling suits.
Nevertheless, employers can manage such complications. For example,
they can include forum-selection clauses in their employment contracts
identifying the preferred state court as the exclusive forum. The
enforceability of such clauses is uncertain, but a federal court foreseeably
might decline to exercise jurisdiction for this reason.245 Once facing
litigation, former employers could make other procedural moves. In some
cases, they could defeat diversity jurisdiction and, hence, removal to federal
court, by joining nondiverse defendants. Moreover, after enough time has
passed for the litigation of a sizable number of NCA enforcement actions,
state choice-of-law standards will be firmly established, constraining to some
extent the freedom of the local federal court to apply contrary law. 2' Indeed,
a recent survey suggests that federal courts
prove more likely than state
247
clauses.
choice-of-law
enforce
to
courts
In conclusion, law-as-commodity competition for enforcement ofNCAs
with tenuous transactional or relational ties to the selected jurisdiction has yet
to emerge. However, conditions prove conducive to such competition,
particularly where firms can establish some kind of link to the forum, and,
accordingly, the forum can justify its exercise of jurisdiction, including
"piggy-backing" on the entity charter or selecting the law of the firm's
operational headquarters.

245. In general, federal courts respond favorably to choice-of-forum clauses, typically
enforcing them. See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 721-22 (2d Cir.
1982) (stating that contractual forum-selection clauses will be enforced unless enforcement
would clearly be unreasonable and unjust).
246. A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice-of-law rules of
the state within which it sits (provided it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant(s) and is
otherwise a proper venue). See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,49697 (1941) (opining that in diversity cases federal courts are prohibited from making independent
choice-of-law determinations and, rather, must apply the law of their state's courts in order to
avoid an unequal administration ofjustice).
247. See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 375 (stating that there was 12% nonenforcement of
choice-of-law clauses amongst federal courts surveyed and 25% amongst state courts surveyed).
And, as the decision in Estee Laudersuggests, federal courts can be as aggressive as state courts
in supporting the underlying state's interest in enforcing an in-state employers' NCA. See supra
note 214 (discussing how Estee Lauder concluded that New York law, not California law,
applied).
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IV. BroaderImplications and Tentative Thoughts on
Interjurisdictional"Self-Defense"

The foregoing analysis has implications extending well beyond the NCA
context. First, the conditions favorable to law-as-commodity competition in the
NCA context show the genuine potential for such competition in employment
law. In addition, it reveals a strategy-racing to judgment--competing states
can utilize to apply their law extraterritorially, even when faced with other
states' resistance. Taken together, these lessons raise the question of how states
can counter such competition when, in their view, it will create a race-to-thebottom within their borders.
A. Law-as-Commodity Competition in Employment Law
Law-as-commodity may emerge where: (i) state employment law regimes
prove sufficiently divergent and create sufficient legal incentives to trump
concerns about other employment law risks; (ii) employers have some
confidence that they can control the judicial forum or at least the judgmententering forum; and (iii) a state with an employer-friendly regime both
perceives the benefits of competition and has a judiciary able and willing to
further its competitive aims by racing to judgment.
Of course, it is too early to predict whether law-as-commodity competition
will aggressively take hold in employment law. For one thing, employers might
see competition as only a second- or third-best option for addressing the rise of
what they perceive as unfavorable state-level employment law regulation. The
ideal response for many employers would be preemptive federal legislation
offering little or no substantive protection for workers. The regulatory vacuum
ERISA created in the regulation of welfare benefit plans serves as an obvious
example.248 If such deregulation proves politically infeasible, many employers
might prefer the certainty federal legislation could provide, as long as it is less
employee-friendly than some states and preempts stricter state laws.
Moreover, fearing a political or public relations backlash or enactment of
more restrictive federal legislation, both states and firms may prove unwilling
to press for extraterritorial application of employment law in areas implicating
longstanding state public policies and in which foreign states have not
traditionally interfered. For example, few legal decisionmakers or managers
may act so boldly as to side-step (by enforcing choice-of-law clauses) employee
248. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing how federal law's preemptive
sweep makes it the predominant source of labor and employee benefits regulation).

INTER.JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION

1435

protections contained in minimum wage statutes or workers' compensation
regimes, even if wider disparities between state regimes emerge. In addition,
the more general interest in maintaining good relations with neighboring
states may provide a countervailing incentive not to compete. For example,
given the need for cross-border regulatory cooperation, New York might
resist the urge to adopt a systematically aggressive approach to applying New
York's more employer-friendly law to employment relationships in New
Jersey.
Law-as-commodity competition, however, seems a genuine possibility
when legal or economic changes give rise to the favorable conditions
described above. For example, in addition to NCAs, other contractual terms
addressing post-employment or dispute resolution matters may produce these
incentive structures. Some such terms-including claw-back, confidentiality,
and training repayment provisions-are, like NCAs, designed to deter
employees from leaving and competing. Others, including nondisparagement
clauses and various types of liquidated damages provisions, also have become
more prominent in recent years, as have terms designed to control ex ante the
forum or judicial process, including not just arbitration clauses, but also jury
and class action waivers, and "loser-pays" attorney fee provisions. As with
NCAs, enforcement of such terms may vary widely by state.
Taken individually, these types of terms might not be enough to spawn
great demand for law as a commodity. However, a state's general willingness
to enforce such provisions might create a powerful incentive for employers to
select that state's substantive law and fora. In other words, a state may
promote its legal regime as generallyfavorableto private orderingand hence
more likely than other states to enforce employer-protective terms. Delaware,
for example, already markets its "strong presumption in favor of private
ordering" in entity chartering, 249 and also has shown its preference for
contractual freedom in the employment context.250 One can imagine
Delaware or another state signaling to employer counsel a willingness to
enforce broadly contract terms in the employment arena.
In addition, if labor and employment law remains largely static at the
federal level, and some states engage in new, significant types of legal
249. See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999)
(emphasizing the policy of freedom of contract that underlies Delaware entity law).
250. See, e.g., Mahani v. Edix Media Group, 935 A.2d 242,245 (Del. 2007) (making clear
in enforcing a fee-shifting provision against a former employee found to have breached a
noncompetition and confidentiality agreement that Delaware will enforce such provisions to the
extent the fees are reasonable); see alsosupra notes 232-33, 239, 241 (highlighting Delaware's
broad enforcement of employment contract terms).
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reform, other states might engage in law-as-commodity competition. Indeed,
states may be far less hesitant to pursue a competition strategy in such
circumstances because, rather than appearing to break with history, they
would offer employers the opportunity to opt into a legal regime "maintaining
the status quo." Such competition-inducing reforms could take a number of
forms, including, inter alia, the enactment of robust individual employee
protections with regard to job security, the work-family balance, or privacy,
or the willingness of state courts to impose new, broad structural remedies on
employers to address systemic discrimination or other legal violations.
Although forum control might pose challenges for employers in these kinds
of matters (which typically arise in the first instance as employee claims),
employers might deploy-and competing states might accommodatecreative litigation strategies to overcome such challenges. 5
Finally, law-as-commodity competition is likely if state-level reforms
begin to pierce the traditional lines between employment and corporate law,
providing a potentially competing state yet another historical hook-the
internal affairs norm-on which to hang aggressive enforcement of its law.
These reforms might include, for example, imposing employment-related
information sharing and disclosure requirements on firms operating within
the jurisdiction; mandating greater employee voice in firm governance;
regulating or rebalancing the relationship between managerial and employee
returns; or providing employees with greater procedural or substantive rights
in layoffs and other types of restructuring. Although we have yet to see such
reforms take hold in the American context, and although some might create
tensions with federal law, a progressive state-California comes to mindforeseeably could consider a recalibration of firm stakeholder relations along
these lines. Powerful employer interest groups obviously would oppose these
kinds of reforms in the first instance. Yet, if such reform efforts are
successful, managers would seek relief through resort to chartering statesDelaware comes to mind-selling entity law consistent with the traditional
model of intra-firm relations. This might trigger fierce interjurisdictional
battles between the state of incorporation and the state of operations.

251. For example, employers could seek early declarative reliefin the friendlyjurisdiction,
or include, and then seek to enforce, choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses even in a
second-filed action in the preferred state.
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B. Self-Defense Against Law-as-Commodity Competition: Some
Tentative Thoughts
Genuine potential for law-as-commodity competition exists in some
employment areas. If one or more states implements this model, other states
obviously are not required to abandon their preferences for their own law. But,
how precisely they can respond to particularly aggressive tactics has not been
explored in detail. In other words, if a state has a strong public policy favoring
a certain protection of domestic workers, how does it prevent a competing state
from seeking to have its less protective law apply extraterritorially?
As a threshold matter, as discussed in Part II.B.3, above, states have great
freedom to reject or limit application of foreign law on firm stakeholders acting
or residing within their borders. States are largely free to apply their own law
in determining whether to enforce the parties' selection of foreign law to
govern their relationship, as they are not constitutionally bound to apply the law
chosen 2by firm stakeholders, and no federal statute mandating such adherence
exists.
Similarly, states need not credit parties' choice-of-forum clauses. Choiceof-forum clauses receive a presumption of validity under the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws,253 often do not offend due process, 254 and are
frequently upheld. 255 But, consistent with the Restatement approach, a forum
the clause if enforcement would threaten a substantial local
need not25enforce
6
interest.

252. This is true in both the corporate and employment contexts. As I argue elsewhere,
Delaware's legal decision makers recognize this great vulnerability with regard to the corporate
internal affairs doctrine: The bottom line is that other states need not adhere to it. Glynn, supra
note 24, at 95, 143.
253. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971) ("The parties'
agreement as to the place of the action will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.").
254. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,473 n.14 (1985) ("Where such
forum-selection provisions have been obtained through 'freely negotiated' agreements and are
not 'unreasonable and unjust,' their enforcement does not offend due process.") (citations
omitted).
255. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing how, due to so many out-of-state firms being
incorporated or chartered within Delaware, the state can justify exercising jurisdiction and
enforcing choice-of-law and forum clauses in contracts pointing to Delaware); Woodward,
supra note 120, at 35 (discussing a tendency of courts to uphold forum selection clauses based
on the assumption that customers freely contract for a specific forum).
256. See Woodward, supra note 120, at 37-41 (analyzing how courts have refused to
uphold forum selection clauses when the clauses have posed a potential conflict with a
fundamental state policy).
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To protect local public policy interests, courts should consider the extent
to which the selected forum might itself engage in competition when deciding
whether to enforce such clauses. Interestingly, states likely to invalidate
choice-of-law clauses in the NCA context appear more willing to enforce
choice-of-forum clauses.25 7 California courts, for example, have upheld forumselection clauses in the NCA context even though, in the absence of such a
clause, they would not enforce the parties' choice of another state's less
protective law. 258 Underlying this difference in approach seems to be the
assumption that enforcing a forum-selection clause is not the same as enforcing
a choice-of-law clause because the forum in which the choice-of-law issue is
litigated does not necessarily determine the outcome. The foregoing discussion
of the disparate application of choice-of-law principles demonstrates the
questionable nature of this assumption,2 9 but it is particularly faulty-indeed
blind-when the chosen state competes with the forum state. Thus, if the
exclusive forum selected contractually is a state engaged in law-as-commodity
competition, and the forum state has a strong policy interest favoring
application of its own law, it should reject the clause for the same reasons it
would reject a choice-of-law provision.
A similar lesson applies if the competing jurisdiction has adopted the
aggressive judicial tactics we observe in the corporate and NCA contexts, and
seeks to enforce its own law by wresting control of the litigation. Until entry of
2 60
final judgment, the dictates of courts in other jurisdictions do not bind states.
Accordingly, although traditional notions of comity suggest restraint in
interjurisdictional tussles, a state is within its power to push ahead despite firstfiled judicial proceedings elsewhere. A court need not-and perhaps should
257. See In re AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Tex. 2007) (concluding that
although Texas law controlled enforcement of NCAs despite the presence of a choice-of-law
provision, litigation of employment disputes in Texas was not a fundamental policy and a
choice-of-forum clause designating Florida over Texas was enforceable); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 Am.
J. COMp. L. 697, 742-47 (2006) (discussing cases enforcing choice-of-forum clauses).
258. See Symeonides, supra note 257, at 742-47 (discussing cases and stating that two
factors have improved the lot of many non-California employers: First, most of those employers
now include in their employment contracts not only a choice-of-law clause, but also a choice-offorum clause and, second, the Advanced Bionics decision); cf Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1022-26 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (assuming Washington would apply the same
Section 187 analysis as California to a choice-of-Washington-law clause in an NCA).
259. See Symeonides, 2002 Annual Survey, supra note 213, at 62-63 (discussing the
potentially critical role of choice-of-forum clauses in NCAs); Woodward, supra note 120, at 35
(describing how enforcement of a forum selection clause may completely destroy a plaintiff's

claim).
260.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 107 (1971).
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not-stay its own proceedings or otherwise hold back when fundamental state
policies are at stake and the other jurisdiction is not acting reciprocally.
Again, such an approach contradicts California's current practice, as
reflected in the great restraint the Advanced Bionics court showed when
confronted with the Minnesota tribunal's aggressive behavior.2 6' If California
is serious about protecting employees working within its borders, it ought to
recalibrate its comity-driven judicial norms to account for interjurisdictional
competition.26 2 To protect its regulatory prerogatives with regard to activities
within its territory, a state must be conscious of other states' potential
engagement in law-as-commodity competition and respond to aggressive tactics
by protecting its jurisdiction and expediting proceedings to prevent the
competitor jurisdiction from entering judgment first.
If the competing jurisdiction nevertheless enters final judgment first, it
binds the state of operations under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to accord
the judgment respect, but even this bar has limits. In particular, a court may not
have to enforce the injunctive portion of the judgment in the same way the
2 63
judgment-entering court would. In Baker v. GeneralMotors Corporation,
the Supreme Court indicated that while a state may not refuse to enforce a
judgment in equity simply because it offends the state's fundamental public
policy, it has discretion to limit injunctive relief that interferes with other state
prerogatives. 26 4 Baker provides very little guidance, 265 but it suggests, for
example, that a court might successfully limit its enforcement of a foreign
injunction barring competition by a former employee to serve other local
interests, such as mitigating harm to third parties.266 Thus, despite full faith and
261. For a discussion of Advanced Bionics, see supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
262. Of course, it may be that the members of the California Supreme Court are not
enamored with the state's statutory prohibition on NCAs, or not enamored enough to press its
enforcement when an employee signed the NCA while working out-of-state. Obviously, if
confronted with both law-as-commodity competition by other states and resistance by local
courts to pressing enforcement of statutory prerogatives, the legislature would have to act to
defend such prerogatives.
263. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 238-41 (1998) (holding that an
injunction barring a former employee from testifying against a car manufacturer in a products
liability case against the manufacturer did not control proceedings elsewhere, and thus, the
employee could testify in an action brought against the manufacturer without offending the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
264. Id.at 223-24.
265. See Polly J. Price, FullFaith and Creditand the Equity Conflict,84 VA. L. REV.747,
764-65 (1998) (claiming that Baker gleans little on the proper understanding of full faith and
credit within the equity context, and that this could confuse state courts considering other types
of equitable decrees).
266. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 ("Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied
enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the
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credit, a state confronting law-as-commodity competition may have some
discretion in deciding whether and how to enforce the injunctive portion of a
competing state's judgment.
Yet, when faced with a truly committed competitor state and powerful
managerial incentives to take advantage of preferable law, such defensive
measures are destined to be imperfect. Absent significant procedural and
structural changes in its court system, a self-defending state may be unable to
beat a competing state to judgment. Delaware, for instance, will always win
such a race. Once the race is lost, the state's judiciary may have flexibility on
enforcing the injunctive portion of the judgment, but it has no discretion to alter
any monetary component.26 7 Firm managers thus can increase the probability
of compliance with a judgment by, for example, including liquidated damages
provisions in employment contracts.268 In the NCA context, a former employer
can also join a worker's putative new employer as a defendant, 269 ensuring its
chosen court's orders have bite, because the new employer likely will want to
do business in the jurisdiction, and will face contempt (or worse) if it fails to
comply.
Most importantly, because of its in terroremeffects, a competing state's
adverse judgments can defeat another state's public policy prerogatives even if
there exists limited potential for extraterritorial enforcement. For instance,
periodic judgments enforcing NCAs entered by a competing state-whether
ultimately enforced elsewhere or not-are likely to deter other employees
subject to such terms from exiting and competing. 27° Likewise, the fear of an
adverse judgment and the potential costs and risks of dueling litigation might
deter other potential employers from hiring employees who have signed such
NCAs. Thus, again, ultimate enforcement in every case is less important than
exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State
had no authority.").
267. See Price, supra note 265, at 757 (discussing how courts have never been sure
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which among other things requires states to enforce
money damage judgments of other states, likewise requires automatic enforcement of
injunctions issued by other states).
268. See id.
at 835 (discussing the complications of such self-defense in the NCA context,
post-Baker); Scott Hovanyetz, Comment, Non-Compete Agreements and the Equity Conflict:
Applying Baker v. General Motors Through the Lens of History, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 253,
276 (2008) (same).
269. Indeed, Medtronic joined a tortious interference claim against Advanced Bionics in its
Minnesota suit and, accordingly, sought and received injunctive relief against both its former
employee and Advanced Bionics. For a discussion of the injunction ruling in Advanced
Bionics, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing the effect whereby an NCA's
presence and potential enforcement affects employee behavior).
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the demonstrated willingness of the competing state to race to judgment on
behalf of employers who have selected that state's law.
This leaves a state seeking to protect its regulatory prerogatives with few
remaining options. One is to join forces with interest groups favoring greater
employee protection and to press for federalization in a particular regulatory
area. Yet, achieving the desired outcome-legislation providing similarly
robust protections-through federalization is uncertain.
In another, less unwieldy approach the state may alter the way in which it
enforces employment mandates. While a state cannot prevent other
jurisdictions from seeking to compete,2 it can minimize the preclusion and in
terrorem problems by shifting to public enforcement of local law against firms
trying to take advantage of foreign law, rather than relying on private
enforcement. As nonparties to the litigation, agency authorities and attorneys
general are not bound by foreign judgments in disputes between private parties.
And, obviously, regulators have a number of means at their disposal to prevent
firms based in the state or doing business there from engaging in conduct that
contravenes local law. In other words, the threatened use of civil or even
criminal sanctions for conduct that directly contravenes local policies may have
its own, countervailing deterrent effect on firms that might otherwise seek to
enforce contract terms in their preferred forum. Thus, although states have
limited options at their disposal to prevent competing states from employing
aggressive judicial tactics, they can, through enhanced public enforcement of
local law, deter firms from taking advantage of such tactics.
Delaware's recent behavior in the corporate area suggests that it perceives
the potential threat direct public enforcement poses to its chartering franchise.
When it claimed in its 2005 VantagePoint
decision that the internal affairs
272
doctrine is a constitutional mandate, the Delaware Supreme Court was aware
of the aggressive post-Enron enforcement of corporate legal norms in other
states, most notably in New York by its then Attorney General, Elliot Spitzer.273
271. Theoretically, a competing state's application of its law to activities occurring in
another jurisdiction might violate the Dormant Commerce Clause if the burden such regulation
imposes on commerce elsewhere is clearly excessive in light of the competing state's legitimate
interests. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that generally state
statutes affecting interstate commerce will be found invalid only if the burden imposed on
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits). However, this possibility is
beyond the scope of this article.
272. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del.
2005) ("[T]his Court has held that an 'application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by
constitutional principles, except in the "rarest situations,"' e.g., when 'the law of the state of
incorporation is inconsistent with a national policy on foreign or interstate commerce.'
(quoting McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987))).
273. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisisin CorporateGovernance: 2002 Style, 40
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These other states had stopped short of regulating directly the internal affairs of
public firms, yet the members of the Delaware court must have recognized that
such regulatory inroads are a clear prospect in times of heightened popular
concern about corporate actors' misconduct. They also must have realized that
Delaware lacked the ability to prevent officials in other states from so acting.
As I contend elsewhere, this threat, along with others, prompted the court to
draft VantagePointnot to serve as a piece of persuasive judge-craft, but rather
to lay the groundwork for a campaign to convince federal courts or Congress to
prevent other states from regulating the internal affairs of Delaware entities.2 74
Again, states may deploy the type of regulatory response that Delaware
fears in the corporate context in the employment setting to protect the rights of
local employees.275 Currently, employment law protections often are enforced
through private rights of action, in judicial and nonjudicial fora.2 76 Faced with
the specter of aggressive behavior by other states, a state could enhance public
enforcement efforts to protect domestic employees or other interests. For
example, California regulatory authorities could prevent out-of-state firms from
doing business in California or impose other less dramatic penalties if the use
of NCAs has anticompetitive effects within the state.
Many other arguments exist for and against a regulatory model that relies
more heavily on public enforcement. In addition, this kind of response has the
potential to prompt ugly interstate disputes over regulatory prerogatives,
although the ugliness of such disputes relative to those created by a competing
state's deployment of aggressive judicial tactics to further a law-as-commodity
franchise exists in the eye of the beholder. Employee rights advocates also
must be watchful that industry groups not use these types of conflicts to press
Hous. L. REv. 1,44-45 (2003) (describing Eliot Spitzer's Wall Street regulatory enforcement
crackdown); H.D. Vinod, Conflict of Interest Economics and Investment Analyst Biases, 70

BROOK. L. REv. 53,59 n.21 (2004) (same). Some states have passed laws that mirror aspects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, and potentially extend
greater protections. See, for example, Deborah Solomon, Zealous States Shake up Legal Status
Quo-Oklahoma's MCI Is Latest Headachefor Federal Officials and CorporateLawyers,

ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at A4, for a discussion of the growing trend by certain states to
further regulate corporate practice.
274. Glynn, supra note 24, at 136-43 (discussing post-Enron pushback against
enforcement efforts).
275. See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 (describing state autonomy with regard to formulating
laws regulating corporate relationships).
WALL

276. Cf. Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? CorporateSelfRegulation and the Low- Wage Workforce, 12 LEwiS & CLARK L. REv. 671, 679-81 (2008)

(stating that employees are largely responsible for enforcing their own employment-related
rights through litigation or complaints to administrative agencies, but agencies often lack the
resources to enforce rights broadly).
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for enactment of deregulatory federal preemptive legislation or a federal choiceof-law regime favoring law-as-commodity competition-the type of pushback
against state enforcement efforts we have seen recently in the corporate
context. 2 17 Nevertheless, where a state's public policy is sufficiently
compelling and the threat of competing state interference is sufficiently acute to
justify the increased regulatory costs, a state can enhance compliance with its
legal norms by expanding public enforcement efforts.
In sum, in the NCA context and elsewhere, states acting for their own
benefit may seek selection of their law and induce races to their courthouses.
But, other states have a number of defensive options at their disposal. At a
minimum, states seeking to maintain more robust employee protections must
recognize the potential for such competition, the means other states may deploy
to further their competitive aims, and the tools available to resist the resulting
race to the bottom. Ultimately, they may need to alter their judicial or
regulatory enforcement practices to prevent firms from taking advantage of
competing states' willingness to press for extraterritorial application of
employer-friendly law.
V. Conclusion
One thing is certain: Firms search for ways to reduce regulatory risks.
The threat that firms will move operations across borders to reduce such risksreflecting the standard type of interjurisdictional competition-already looms
large in the labor and employment context. In contrast, the prospect of law-ascommodity competition in this area has not received much attention. Now it
should. Contractual selection of favorable state law presents an attractive
option for employers if selected states-and, in particular, theirjudiciaries-are
willing to extend their law extraterritorially. This already happening to some
extent in the NCA context, and genuine potential exists for this kind of
competition to emerge in other areas, particularly if state employment law
reforms widen disparities between jurisdictions.
Those concerned about employee welfare, therefore, must be watchful.
States with an interest in regulating employment relationships need not accept
employer-preferred contract terms, including choice-of-law clauses. Yet, this is
not enough. Legal decision makers must also understand how firms and
competing states might defeat local policy preferences through litigation
techniques and aggressive judicial conduct, and respond by altering their
277. See Glynn, supra note 24, at 142 (discussing the corporate post-Enron pushback
against the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and federal securities laws).
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judicial and regulatory behavior to counteract this threat. A state's failure to
recognize and respond to the rise of a cooperative venture between firms and a
competing state could result in creeping nullification of protections for local
workers. In a very real sense, then, inattention in this context could be
hazardous to a state's policy interests.

